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The national security of the United States and the ability of the US government to provide for 
the nation’s common defense has declined since the end of the nuclear innovation age in the 
late 1980s. Nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons have deteriorated due to political pressure, 
decreasing oil prices, and apathy toward the America’s nuclear infrastructure and 
community. This thesis examines the US government’s inability to guarantee the nation’s 
security from rising powers like China and India due to America’s lack of nuclear innovation 
over the last 30 years. Utilizing historical narratives, scientific examinations, and geopolitical 
data, this thesis will demonstrate that 21st century security threats from conventional powers 
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Energy is the master resource. Like access to food and water, energy is foundational 
for economies, governments, militaries, agriculture, and industry. Conflict over energy and 
resources combined with national sovereignty pursuits has sparked engagements in the South 
China Sea throughout the 21st Century, Kuwait in the 1990s, and even the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor. Nations with energy feel powerful and secure, while nations without energy 
feel threatened and vulnerable. Energy security is either peace or war.  
On December 2nd, 1942, an Italian physicist named Enrico Fermi and a team of 
physicists changed the concept of energy forever by successfully harnessing nuclear power 
for the first time. They produced the first controlled nuclear chain reaction in their Chicago 
Pile-1 nuclear reactor, quickly leading to the development of the atomic weapon.1 This 
scientific breakthrough prevented a costly Japanese land war and led the conclusion of World 
War II, the beginning of the Cold War, a race for nuclear power management, and a 
fundamental shift in international relations and national security. A nation’s power and 
stability quickly became reliant on the pursuit of nuclear technologies.  
Simply put, nuclear energy and technology is the essence of a modern, 21st Century 
nation. This thesis seeks to demonstrate that the presence of nuclear innovation directly 
correlates to a nation’s strategic strength as a world power. Specifically, this thesis identifies 
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complacency toward nuclear technological innovation as negatively affecting US national 
security placing the nation at risk from the rising 21st Century powers.”2 
 After the Second World War (WWII), the advent of nuclear power forced drastic 
changes. Both the US and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) soon entered a period 
that this thesis has labeled, “the first nuclear innovation age,” whereupon these rival 
superpowers raced to outperform and out-design one another. These nations saw the need to 
innovate and build bigger, faster, further-flying weaponry to guarantee their national security. 
In an arms race of such magnitude, new defense requirements were constantly arising, 
requiring innovation for safety against mutually assured destruction (MAD). 
Nuclear power is a complex and often dangerous energy source that requires constant 
attention so that it does not become unintentionally deadly or unusable. The first nuclear 
innovation age produced a powerful source of both energy and political power that has 
become the largest guarantor of national security in the modern age. National security is the 
“measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multi-dimensional threats to 
the well-being of its people and its survival as a nation-state, by balancing all instruments of 
state policy through governance, and is extendable to global security by variables external to 
it.”3 Typically, the idea of national security is made simple by separating out individual 
categories or dimensions that ultimately come together to “overcome the multi-dimensional 
threats” that exist in today’s geopolitical climate. National security as a construct involves 
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military security (offensive and defensive), political security (international balance of power 
and diplomacy), economic security, environmental security, and energy security.4   
The single largest factor that links these dimensions together is the presence of a 
robust, innovative nuclear power program in a nation, or close ties to a nation that has one. 
This thesis hopes to demonstrate how nuclear power has permeated every dimension of 
national security. This includes risks to nations without nuclear programs, along with nations 
that have failed to fund and improve their nuclear programs. Historically, nuclear innovation 
has furthered national security, and without the constant development of nuclear science and 
weapons that began following World War II, national security the violate state seen today.   
The progression of global nuclear innovation can be categorized into three distinct 
periods: the first age (1945-1986), the fall (1986-2009), and the second age (2009-present). 
With the dawning of the first nuclear innovation age, the core dimensions of national security 
suddenly became solely reliant on a nation’s nuclear capabilities instead of the size and 
competency of its military. The idea of possessing the scientific capabilities to maintain a 
sustained nuclear chain reaction, has, for the last 70 years, almost exclusively dictated the list 
of world powers, bringing those powers to the brink of global war on several tenuous 
occasions, with US nuclear supremacy and fear of Mutual Assured Destruction causing the 
USSR to back down during the 1961 Cuban missile crisis. This thesis will examine the tenets 
of national security and the important role that nuclear innovation and nuclear power has 
played in 20th and 21st centuries.  
Rapid nuclear innovation prompted the Cold War’s conclusion. Just as the fields 
within nuclear physics constantly drive one another to improve, so did the Soviet Union and 
                                                          






US. With national security now relying so heavily on nuclear power, nations felt the need to 
innovate quickly to stay ahead of their rivals and prevent their destruction. However, support 
for the first nuclear innovation age began its dramatic decline following two nuclear 
accidents: one in Three Mile Island, Pennsylvania; and a second, more disastrous accident in 
Chernobyl, Ukraine. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the disbanding of the 
USSR, funding for nuclear innovation bottomed out as public fear and domestic focus 
redirected funding, and focus was shifted onto the cheap alternatives of natural gas and oil.5 
This thesis will examine the downward trend in nuclear expenditures, the need to support 
nuclear innovation, current nuclear stockpiles, and the pursuit of nuclear reactors. 
 While the end of the first nuclear innovation age took a severe toll on the global 
nuclear community, several nations have begun a second nuclear innovation age. The nuclear 
technologies of China and India have progressed at a staggering rate. For perspective, in 
1995, the US nuclear power industry produced approximately 100 GWe from 109 reactors,6 
and China produced 2.1 GWe from 3 reactors. In 2017, the US produced 99 GWe from 99 
reactors – while China produced approximately 40 GWe from 38 reactors.7 China has 20 
additional reactors under construction with a projected output of 58 GWe by 2020, and up to 
150 GWe by 2030. China’s focus on improving their nuclear capabilities will directly 
translate into an ability to more aggressively posture against the US throughout the Pacific.  
                                                          
5 Ahmed Abdulla, "A Retrospective Analysis of Funding and Focus in US Advanced Fission Innovation," 
(Environmental Research Letters, August 2017). 
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/356082/27654623/1502645550377/Abdulla_2017_Environ._Res._Lett._12
_084016.pdf?token=hY99KQqU96mHKGzeZOixY%2FvviLo%3D. 
6 GWe = gigawatts of electrical output. To clarify, reactors typically make up a power plant, with the majority 
of nuclear power plants having two or more reactors comprising them. 
 






 India has been pursuing similar, although less extreme growth. Since India is not a 
signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, it has been banned from trade in key 
nuclear materials for the last 34 years, significantly hampering its development of nuclear 
energy until 2009, when many restrictions were lifted. India, which possessed 1.7 GWe of 
nuclear power well into the 2000s, expects to have 14.6 GWe of nuclear capacity on line by 
2024 and 63 GWe by 2032, aiming to supply 25% of the nation’s total electricity from 
nuclear power by 2050.8 India is an important strategic partner of the US and while their 
growing power is not a direct threat to the US, it is a growing threat to regional and global 
stability. Although the India-China rivalry is a fairly conventional, historical-style rivalry, the 
India-Pakistan rivalry is a hate-filled, ethnic, religious, nationalistic rivalry that has the 
potential to destabilize the entire region at a moment’s notice. As India improves their 
infrastructure and technology, their new confidence could lead to a legitimate conflict in the 
region. 
Both China and India have seen substantial growth in terms of investment in 
infrastructure, sponsorship of research and development (R&D), and total power output. This 
growth over the last several decades has put them on course to surpass the US’ nuclear 
capabilities, possibly as early as 2050. Drawing upon recent advancements and future 
projections, this thesis will also examine US national security in the context of the expanding 
nuclear infrastructures of foreign powers.  
The US deterioration in nuclear innovation over the last three decades reflects apathy 
among the nation’s political and scientific elite. Neglect and complacency has allowed 
nuclear research, nuclear technologies, nuclear power plants, and nuclear production to 
                                                          






become outdated over time. 19 nuclear reactors have been decommissioned since the 
Chernobyl disaster and 82% of US nuclear warheads have been disassembled, based on the 
number of warheads present when the Berlin Wall fell in late 1989.”9 In 2012, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission approved the first construction permit in 34 years, approving 
construction of four new reactors, two at the existing Vogtle Plant in Georgia, and two at the 
Summer Plant in South Carolina.10 While some began declaring that the US nuclear 
“renaissance” had finally begun, the current state of the two projects demonstrates the state 
of indifference in the US. The Summer project was entirely abandoned after Westinghouse 
Electric declared bankruptcy, and the Vogtle project is currently five years behind schedule 
and $9 billion over budget, and by the time of completion, the new reactor could have a price 
tag of up to $25 billion.11 
However, beginning circa 2015, nations beside China and India have shown renewed 
interest in nuclear weapons and reactors. As Cold War weapons have continued to age, some 
approaching the 50-year mark, nations look to revitalize their aging stockpiles as new 
national security threats arise. The potential for newer, safer, more efficient technology may 
also help catalyze US interest in nuclear development and investment. The current 
administration, under President Trump, has shown a willingness to acknowledge the need for 
innovation and expansion of nuclear capabilities, demonstrated in his February 2018 Nuclear 
Posture Review, but the administration must overcome pressure from the anti-nuclear groups 
in addition to convincing the general public that new nuclear weapons and an increased focus 
                                                          
9 "List of All Decommissioned Power Plants in USA,"  (Public Watchdogs, Sept 2016). 
https://publicwatchdogs.org/list-decommissioned-nuclear-power-plants-usa/. 
10 "Nuclear Regulatory Commission Approves Construction of First Nuclear Units in 30 Years,"  (Energy 
Information Administration, March 5, 2012). https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=5250. 






on nuclear energy is a viable path forward. When comparing its aging nuclear infrastructure 
with the emergence of foreign nuclear capabilities, the US government must adapt or decline 








CHAPTER II:  
 
 
THE EARLY DAYS 
A significant portion of the initial content in this thesis will be dedicated to presenting 
the background and direction of nuclear innovation. It will focus heavily on the historical 
study of the science and experiments that led up to and ultimately drove the first innovation 
age. Additionally, basic understanding of the science behind nuclear physics is necessary to 
understand the current state of international security. Whether it is conceptualizing the 
science behind a nuclear chain reaction or the difference between fission and fusion, context 
is a foundational component of this scientifically complex topic that includes modern 
physics, chemistry, and nuclear power. This section of the thesis will include a combination 
of biographies and narratives to best provide the timeline of events that led to the nuclear 
innovation age.  
Before the US began its own nuclear development project circa WWII, the study of 
nuclear physics was almost exclusively limited to European nations during the 1910s and 
1920s. Scientific powerhouses such as Britain and Germany were joined by brilliant minds 
from smaller, yet not insignificant nations, such as The Netherlands and Hungary, to pioneer 
many of the 20th century breakthroughs. However, the story of national security, modern 
warfare, and modern science actually begins on the British Commonwealth island of New 
Zealand. Born on a flax farm on an island that had been discovered only 100 years before his 
birth, future Nobel Laureate Ernest Rutherford would go on to literally change the world.  
Ernest Rutherford and the students he taught over the decades, nine of whom would 





single foundational piece of nuclear physics, nuclear weapons, and nuclear reactors.12 
Rutherford either independently discovered or led the team that discovered radioactive half-
life, alpha and beta particles, the proton, the neutron, the ability to split an atom, and the 
existence of the atomic nucleus. Migrating from New Zealand to Canada, and ultimately to 
Great Britain allowed Rutherford and his teams to make use of the robust European scientific 
infrastructure where they focused on experimental physics. Rutherford’s discoveries during 
his life were so significant that German theoretical physicist Albert Einstein, widely regarded 
to be the greatest theoretical physicist ever, often described Rutherford to his contemporaries 
as “the second Newton.”13  
In 1911, while testing the validity of the accepted atomic model, Rutherford 
accidently discovered the nucleus, and nuclear physics, the study of the atomic nuclei was 
born. Later in his life, Rutherford said of the experiment, “It was the most remarkable event 
of my life. It’s as if you’ve fired a large, heavy shell at a piece of tissue paper and it came 
back and hit you.”14 The next science-altering discovery that Rutherford contributed to is a 
phenomenon called nuclear transmutation. Historically, transmutation has been a feature of 
mythology and the object of desire for alchemists. The story of King Midas, the mythical 
Greek king that turned objects into gold by touch being the most well-known example of 
transmutation. Rutherford and physicist Frederick Soddy first discovered natural nuclear 
                                                          
12 Rutherford’s Nobel-winning students included: Otto Hahn, James Chadwick, C.F. Powell, Ernest Walton, 
Niels Bohr, Patrick Blackett, Frederick Soddy, John Cockcroft, Edward Appleton. Historians have described the  
Cavendish Laboratory as a “Nobel prize factory,” but Rutherford’s tutelage is what ultimately created the Nobel 
prize factory.  
13 Richard Reeves, A Force of Nature: The Frontier Genius of Ernest Rutherford, 1st ed., Great discoveries, 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2008). 
14 Malcolm Longair, "When Rutherford split the atom," interview by Ricky Nathvani, 2017, 
https://www.thenakedscientists.com/articles/interviews/when-rutherford-split-atom. In his experiment, 
Rutherford shot alpha particles at a thin piece of gold foil. He expected the alpha particles to pass straight 
through the foil, due to no knowledge of the nucleus, but instead, the alpha particles bounced off in all 





transmutation in 1901 when they observed radioactive decay in a piece of Thorium that was 
naturally turning itself into radium through radiation. Reportedly, upon Soddy identifying the 
process as transmutation, Rutherford said “...don’t call it transmutation! They’ll have our 
heads off as alchemists.”15 
The majority of scientific research in Britain came to a grinding halt when much of 
the scientific community was poached for the war effort in 1914. Rutherford himself was 
acquired by the British Navy and worked with the anti-submarine division, contributing to 
the invention of early sonar devices to be used against the German U-boats.16 While he 
worked on sonar technologies, he continued minor experiments by himself in the laboratory. 
During his spare time one day, Rutherford noticed some previously unexplained radiation in 
the air around alpha particles, which he identified as nitrogen. He began experimenting with 
the relationship between alpha particles and nitrogen until the war ended. On January 9, 1919 
he bombarded pure nitrogen atoms with alpha particles, which broke down the nucleus of the 
nitrogen atoms, releasing hydrogen and oxygen atoms in the process. As a result, he had 
successfully split the atom and became the first true alchemist in history, artificially changing 
one element into another.  
Out of this groundbreaking experiment, he also realized that the hydrogen atom, split 
off of the nitrogen atom, had further implications. The hydrogen atom, he discovered, was 
the missing ingredient in the makeup of the atom, and Rutherford labeled it as the “proton.”. 
But he quickly realized there was a problem with his view of the atom; the new mass still 
didn’t add up. There was still an unexplained weight missing from the total mass of the atom, 
even with the electrons and protons in place. With this in mind, in 1920, he proposed in a 
                                                          
15 Francisco Doménech, "The True Alchemists," (The Open Mind, September 2015). 
https://www.bbvaopenmind.com/en/the-true-alchemists/. 





lecture that there could be a neutral component to the nucleus, which he preemptively labeled 
as the “neutron”. For the next 10 years, Rutherford’s primary goal was to prove the existence 
of the neutron with the help of his former student, James Chadwick.  
In conjunction with Chadwick’s work on and eventual discovery of the neutron, two 
more of Rutherford’s students, Ernest Walton and John Cockcroft began combining several 
of Rutherford’s discoveries. They intended to create a prototype particle accelerator that 
would speed up protons in order to artificially split the nucleus of a lithium atom.17 
Rutherford’s 1919 experiment with nitrogen had broken off a piece of the nucleus, but not 
truly split the atom. To split the atom would require something traveling at much higher 
speeds. The particle accelerator allowed protons to achieve those high speeds and the lithium 
atom was successfully split, producing two alpha particles, and confirming all the theories of 
Rutherford and his team. In 1933, Rutherford published an article and gave his now-famous 
lecture that confirmed to the scientific community and general public that the atom was fully 
discovered and had been successfully split.18  
Sitting in the audience at Rutherford’s 1933 speech was a man who would turn 
Rutherford’s concepts into actionable science and help kick start US involvement in nuclear 
physics. Throughout his largely unknown career, Hungarian physicist-inventor Leo Szilard 
proved himself a master at turning Rutherford’s theories and models into actionable physics. 
Rutherford’s article and lecture stated that splitting the atom was not an effective method for 
generating energy and that “anyone who looked for a source of power in the transformation 
of the atom was talking moonshine.”19 Shortly after fleeing to England from Hitler’s rise in 
                                                          
17 Rhodes, The making of the atomic bomb. 
18 Rhodes, The making of the atomic bomb. 





Germany, Szilard, irritated about Rutherford dismissal of atoms as a source of power, 
realized that a nuclear chain reaction, like a chain reaction in chemistry, could theoretically 
be generated in order to create huge quantities of energy. Splitting one atom would generate 
two neutrons, which would split two atoms, generating four neutrons, and so on. 
 
 
Figure 1 Nuclear Chain Reaction20 
 
 Szilard conducted his first chain reaction experiment at Columbia University, using a 
simple radium-beryllium source to bombard a small quantity of Uranium. For a nuclear chain 
reaction to be sustainable, the chain reaction must produce more than 2 neutrons, on average, 
per fission.21 During the experiment, he observed a significant increase in neutrons, 
demonstrating that his chain reaction theory was possible. After proving the feasibility, he 
was able to convince Enrico Fermi, an Italian physicist considered to be the expert on 
Uranium at the time, to join him and conduct the experiment on a larger scale 
                                                          
20 "Nuclear Chain Reaction,"  in Encyclopedia Britannica (2015). https://www.britannica.com/science/nuclear-
chain-reaction. 
21 The verbiage “on average” is commonly used because a fission is not always perfect, sometimes 1 neutron is 
produced, or sometimes 3 or 4 neutrons are produced. In U-235, 2.5 neutrons are produced. Meeting this 





 Once Szilard’s theory on the possibility of nuclear reactions was proven valid, he 
became concerned that the Nazis could easily replicate the experiment with Uranium and 
water and begin developing nuclear energy and nuclear weapons of their own. In an attempt 
to prevent the Nazis from re-creating the experiment, Szilard and another physicist, Eugene 
Wigner, penned a warning letter to the Belgian embassy.22 At the time, the Belgian Congo 
was the best source of raw Uranium in the world, and Szilard wanted to guarantee that the 
Belgians would not supply the Germans with Uranium. In order to legitimize the letter, 
Szilard had his long-time friend and former business partner, Albert Einstein, who had 
connections to the Belgian royal family, sign the letter. An acquaintance of Szilard’s, 
economist Alexander Sachs, also suggested that a letter also be presented to President 
Roosevelt, to warn him of the possible danger posed by Germany. The letter and explanation 
that Sachs presented to Roosevelt was so compelling that the President began setting up 
committees, eventually solidifying into the ambiguously-named “Development of Substitute 
Materials” project.23  
 The President ultimately decided to have the new nuclear project run by the Army 
instead of the Navy, since the Army had more experience with large-scale construction.24 
The Army Corps of Engineers Construction Division, under Colonel Leslie Groves, was 
chosen to lead Roosevelt’s new project. Colonel Groves, wanting to draw upon the best 
architectural minds in the US, moved from his old position at the Syracuse Engineering 
                                                          
22 Rhodes, The making of the atomic bomb. 
23 Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan, the Army and the Atomic B omb, United States Army in World War II Special 
studies, (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. G.P.O., 1985). 





District25 to the newly formed Manhattan District located in downtown New York City. 
Groves soon moved his headquarters to Washington D.C., but since he was already 
informally referring to the Development of Substitute Materials project as the “Manhattan 
Project”, the name stuck and was officially changed. The race against the Nazi physicists for 




                                                          





CHAPTER III:  
 
 
BUILDING A BOMB 
“I think it is important to emphasize the role of industry in the Manhattan Project, 
because I deplore the tendency of myself and my colleagues to pretend that, with our own 
hands, we actually did this job. We had something to do with it. If it had not been for 
scientists, there would have been no atomic bomb; but if there had been only scientists, there 
also would be no atomic bomb.”26 J. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Los Alamos 
Laboratory and “father of the atomic bomb,” voiced this during a testimony before Congress 
in 1945, after two of his bombs were dropped on the nation of Japan. A common 
misconception that has always existed among the general public regarding the Manhattan 
Project was that it was primarily a large science experiment with minor engineering 
elements. However, the Manhattan Project was the “building of a weapons production 
system, as opposed to the building of three individual bombs.”27  
The government diverted huge quantities of money and manpower away from the 
front-line war effort to fund the project, going “all in” in a relatively short period of time. 
This section of the context portion will demonstrate the length at which the government was 
willing to go to beat the Germans to the atomic bomb. Overnight, the US changed nuclear 
physics from a scientific curiosity into a national project, and eventually a global pursuit. 
Physicist Neils Bohr summarized the industrial efforts when he reportedly told physicist 
                                                          
26 Alex Wellerstein, "The Price of the Manhattan Project," (RESTRICTED DATA: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog, 
May 2013). http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/05/17/the-price-of-the-manhattan-project/. 
27 Wellerstein, "The Price of the Manhattan Project." Three full bombs were constructed during the course of 





Edward Teller upon seeing Los Alamos: "You see, I told you it couldn't be done without 
turning the whole country into a factory. You have done just that."28 
With Colonel Groves at the helm of the project, construction began at an explosive 
rate. The five primary sites that Groves and his team selected were: the Chicago Met Lab, for 
Plutonium research and nuclear reactor design; the Hanford Site, for Plutonium production; 
the Clinton Engineer Works,29 for enriching Uranium; the P-9 heavy water production plant; 
and Project Y, or “Los Alamos Laboratory,” for designing the bombs.  
The resources that the government put into constructing the sites alone demonstrate 
its commitment to the project:  
 
Table 1 Manhattan Project Economic Layout30 
SITE/PROJECT 1945 DOLLARS 2012 DOLLARS % 
OAK RIDGE $1,188,352,000 $18,900,000,000 63% 
—K-25 GASEOUS DIFFUSION 
PLANT 
$512,166,000 $8,150,000,000 27% 
—Y-12 ELECTROMAGNETIC 
PLANT 
$477,631,000 $7,600,000,000 25% 
—CLINTON ENGINEER WORKS 
HQ  
$155,951,000 $2,480,000,000 8% 
—CLINTON LABORATORIES $26,932,000 $430,000,000 1% 
—S-50 THERMAL DIFFUSION 
PLANT 
$15,672,000 $250,000,000 1% 
HANFORD ENGINEER WORKS $390,124,000 $6,200,000,000 21% 
SPECIAL OPERATING 
MATERIALS 
$103,369,000 $1,640,000,000 5% 
LOS ALAMOS PROJECT $74,055,000 $1,180,000,000 4% 
RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
$69,681,000 $1,110,000,000 4% 
GOVERNMENT OVERHEAD $37,255,000 $590,000,000 2% 
HEAVY WATER PLANTS $26,768,000 $430,000,000 1% 
GRAND TOTAL $1,889,604,000 $30,060,000,000  
 
                                                          
28 Wellerstein, "The Price of the Manhattan Project." 
29 Often referred to as “Oak Ridge” because of the nearby town where the staff lived. 






Additionally, there were approximately 130,000 people involved with the project, 
approximately 1% of the US’s 1945 population of around 140 million. 
Physicists like Szilard and Fermi, who just five years before were unable to conduct 
their experiment because of budget constraints, were suddenly provided with a blank check. 
Groves’ massive construction projects began taking shape, and after 4 months, Fermi and 
Szilard got to test their hypotheses on a large scale. Nuclear historian Richard Rhodes 
summarizes the event: 
“On the cold winter afternoon of 2 December 1942, in a disused doubles squash court 
under the stands of the University of Chicago football stadium, the Nobel laureate 
physicist Enrico Fermi, a refugee from Fascist Italy, calmly initiated the world’s first 
controlled nuclear-fission chain reaction. Other than hand-operated cadmium control 
rods, nothing visibly moved in the garage-sized graphite and natural uranium 
assembly Fermi and his crew had stacked up by hand over the preceding two months. 
(Fermi called the assembly a “pile” in amused reference to its stacked arrangement.) 
The reactor required no radiation shielding. The energy it produced by splitting—
“fissioning”—uranium atoms, held to a mere 200 watts, was not even enough to 
warm the unheated court.1 Yet the experiment was transformative, presaging both 
nuclear power and atomic bombs.”31 
 
After the Chicago-Pile 1 success, innovation in the Manhattan Project was the top 
priority. Since many of the components and elements required to build the new atom bomb 
could not be purchased, the 130,000 person workforce had to invent and build the numerous 
ingredients and components. The largest was the K-25 gaseous diffusion project at Oak 
Ridge, accounting for almost one-third of the entire Manhattan Project budget, approximately 
$8.5bn in 2012 USD.32  
                                                          
31 Richard Rhodes, Energy : A Human History, First Simon & Schuster hardcover edition. ed., (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 2018). 
 






Figure 2 K-25 superimposed next to the Pentagon, for scale33 
 
The work at K-25 was largely separate from the rest of the Manhattan Project’s work. 
The level of secrecy and compartmentalization meant that, in addition to being cut off from 
the Manhattan Project, the employees were cut off from the world itself. To put into 
perspective the vast amount of employees isolated at the Oak Ridge complex, the local 
intramural sports program there included: badminton, shuffleboard, bowling, golf, tennis, 
horseshoe tournaments, hiking, casting, riding, roller-skating, mini-golf, 26 teams of touch 
football, a baseball league with 10 teams, and 10 softball leagues with 81 teams.34 The 
majority of the employees working at K-25 and the attached facilities had no idea on what 
they were actually working. All the employees were told was that: it involved building very 
large buildings; there were various health hazards involved; and it was an important war 
project. 
                                                          
33 Alex Wellerstein, "Inside K-25," (RESTRICTED DATA: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog). 
http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2013/05/24/inside-k-25/. 
 





The purpose of the plant specifically was to extract U-235 out of U-238 for use in 
weapons and piles (which are now called “reactors”). Naturally occurring Uranium is a 
combination of two different forms, which are called isotopes: U-238 (92 protons + 146 
neutrons = 238) and U-235 (92 protons + 143 neutrons = 235). “The isotope that both 
fissions and chain-reacts, releasing energy, is U235. But most of natural uranium is U238; 
U235 is only about 1 part in 140, or .07 percent—seven-tenths of 1 percent. Even more 
troublesome, the two isotopes are chemically identical, which means they can’t be separated 
using chemical means.”35 This is where K-25 came in. 
In a gaseous diffusion enrichment plant, Uranium hexafluoride (UF6) gas was fed 
into the pipes where it was pumped through special filters called porous membranes. The 
holes in the membranes were so small that there was barely enough room for the UF6 gas 
molecules to pass through. The isotope enrichment occurred because the lighter UF6 gas 
molecules (with the U-235 atoms) diffused faster through the barriers than the heavier UF6 
gas molecules containing U-238.36t took hundreds of barriers, one after the other, before the 
UF6 gas contained enough U-235 to be used in nuclear fuel. At the end of the process, the 
enriched UF6 gas was withdrawn from the pipelines and condensed back into a liquid that 
was then poured into containers. The UF6 was allowed to cool and solidify before it was 
transported to fuel fabrication facilities.￼37 
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Figure 3 Gaseous Diffusion Diagram38 
 
While the Oak Ridge K-25 plant was the largest and most costly of all the Manhattan 
Project efforts, the science and design project at Los Alamos was the most secretive and has 
become most commonly synonymous with the “Manhattan Project” name. The original 
intention was for the lab to be located with the other facilities at Oak Ridge, but Director 
Oppenheimer pushed for a separate lab location in the desert of New Mexico, near a more 
isolated area where testing could be more easily conducted. The government acquired 45,000 
acres of land near the abandoned Los Alamos Ranch School, and Groves allocated $300,000 
for its construction.39 The sole responsibility of the Los Alamos Laboratory was to design a 
bomb based on the principles of a nuclear chain reaction.  
The scientists were tasked with creating a fission bomb using Plutonium as the 
primary ingredient. Through theory and experimentation, physicists discovered that a concept 
called “supercriticality” was required for a bomb. Whereas criticality is simply the presence 
of a sustained nuclear chain reaction, as in the Chicago Pile-1 or in any nuclear reactor, 
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supercriticality is an exponential increase of neutrons in the chain reaction able to create an 
explosion. If the right conditions and the proper quantity of fissile material exists (called 
critical mass, “proper” is an important word here because critical mass is not a specific 
number), the natural tendency is for Uranium or Plutonium to go supercritical, tearing itself 
apart, ending the reaction, and returning to a stable state.40 In Chicago Pile-1, for example, 
the physicists were able to slow down and control the flow of neutrons with control rods, 
making the Uranium critical, but avoiding supercriticality. In Los Alamos, the physicists 
were tasked with not only creating a supercritical reaction, but maintaining a reaction long 
enough to generate a large explosion before the Uranium or Plutonium tore itself apart and 
ended the reaction early. 
The initial design method was a “gun-type” bomb, using Plutonium, that the lab 
dubbed, “Thin Man.”41 The basic premise of Thin Man was that a hollow, subcritical 
Plutonium cylinder “bullet” would be propelled down a “gun barrel” by cordite, a 
gunpowder-like substance used in munitions.42 The hollow bullet would collide with a 
subcritical Plutonium “target spike” at the other end of the barrel. As the bullet traveled down 
the 6 foot-long barrel, the two would achieve criticality when they were 9.8 inches apart, 
building up neutrons that would generate supercriticality and then an explosion. However, 
the scientists quickly realized that, while this design would work in theory, they had selected 
the wrong material. In the experiments, the Plutonium would generate too many neutrons 
while traveling down the barrel, achieving supercriticality too early and leading to a pre-
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detonation, causing the materials to rip apart before a large explosion could occur. 
Additionally, the scientists realized that an explosion produced by this method would be very 
inefficient, with the reaction ending before the majority of the energy could be expelled, even 
if pre-detonation were somehow avoided.43  
 
Figure 4 Gun-Type Bomb Model44 
The final iteration of the gun-type bomb developed by Los Alamos, but never tested until 
“Little Boy” was dropped on Hiroshima, used Uranium as the fuel instead of Plutonium. The 
Uranium was able to generate just enough neutrons traveling down the barrel that a large 
explosion was generated while pre-detonation was avoided. 
An alternative bomb that a small group of physicists had begun working on in the 
early days of Los Alamos was called the, “implosion bomb”. Due to the perceived simplicity 
of the gun-type bomb, the implosion bomb had been regarded as more of a scientific 
curiosity at Los Alamos. Physicist Seth Neddermeyer and a team had begun conducting 
research into an alternate Plutonium bomb using similar physics concepts to the gun type 
bomb, but vastly different munitions principles. The idea behind Neddermeyer’s bomb was 
that a solid sphere of Plutonium (called a core) could achieve the desirable critical mass - 
using substantially less material of lower purification - by detonating non-nuclear chemical 
                                                          
43 The relative crudity of the gun-type bomb meant that only about 1% of its fissile material reacted — it was 
many times less powerful, even though it had roughly 10x more fissile material its alternative design. 






explosives in a spherical pattern around the subcritical core.45 The inward explosion, 
precisely timed in order to be symmetrical, would so compress the core that critical mass 
would be achieved, and a substantial nuclear explosion would occur. 
 
Figure 5 Implosion Bomb Model 
The biggest difficulty that the team faced in legitimizing their design was the 
requirement that the explosives must fire at a precise time, or else the bomb would not work. 
Los Alamos was temporary home to many of the world’s best chemists and physicists, but 
mathematicians were in short supply. Before the invention of modern computers, explosives 
were one of the most difficult phenomena to model and predict mathematically. Los Alamos 
enlisted the help of possibly the only man alive that could provide the mathematical 
calculations to accurately model and design the implosion bomb, Hungarian mathematician 
John von Neumann. Von Neumann, regarded as one of the all-time smartest men in history in 
terms of raw brain power,46 developed the modeling for the explosive lenses that would be 
instrumental in creating the bomb. These lenses function similar to optical lenses, however, 
instead of focusing light waves, they focus and shape detonation waves. With von 
Neumann’s aid, Los Alamos’ work was nearly completed, and it was up to the other 
Manhattan Project sites to build the bomb and its components.  
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As the Manhattan Project began approaching a completed product, the discussion of 
testing began in mid-1944. There was large-spread support from the scientists involved, but 
General Groves was hesitant to move forward with testing due to financial concerns. Groves’ 
worry was that the bomb was not near completion, and if they tested too soon they could 
potentially destroy the Plutonium if the bomb was a failure. This Plutonium represented the 
entire worldwide quantity at the time and was worth up to $1 billion 2012 USD47. The other 
concern presented was the obvious safety and security required for a large test of such an 
unknown weapon. The scientists required a flat area with minimal wind, and eventually 
selected Alamogordo Bombing Range, 230 miles south of Los Alamos, and began 
construction in December 1944. The sparse working conditions there forced the inhabitants 
to build many of their amenities from scratch, and the base camp was accidentally bombed 
twice in May 1945 due to its proximity to the existing bombing range.48  
On April 12, 1945, less than three months after being inaugurated for his fourth term, 
President Roosevelt died of a cerebral hemorrhage, leaving a country who was at war, in the 
hands of the uneducated Missouri farmer who had been Vice President for 82 days, Harry S 
Truman.49 Truman was sworn in at 7:00pm on the 12th, and promptly attended a cabinet 
meeting, where the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, said that Truman needed “to know 
about an immense project that was under way – a project working on the development of a 
new explosive of almost unbelievable destructive power.”50 On April 25th, Truman received 
                                                          
47 Wellerstein, "The Price of the Manhattan Project." 
 
48 Alex Wellerstein, "How to Die at Los Alamos," (RESTRICTED DATA: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog, February 
2015). http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2015/02/13/how-to-die-at-los-alamos/. 
49 President Truman is commonly referred to as “uneducated” because he was the only 20th century U.S 
President that did not graduate from college.  
 





the first of many briefings informing him of the existence of a multi-billion dollar weapons 
program to build an atomic bomb.  
With the new President sworn in and the Germans bowing out of the war on May 7th, 
the preparations for the nuclear test continued in earnest. The test was scheduled between 
July 18th and July 21st due to favorable weather predicted for the dates. However, President 
Truman specifically requested that the test be conducted earlier, on July 16th, due to the 
Potsdam Conference beginning on the same date.  
The majority of the scientists present for the test estimated that the bomb would 
generate a detonation of approximately 5,000 tons of TNT, or 5kT. Scattered between the test 
tower and the three observation bunkers 10,000 yards away were various structures and 
objects that were placed so that the bomb’s effect on certain objects at specific ranges could 
be observed. Many of the 250 observers, and all of those closest to the blast lay on their 
backs with their feet toward the tower, due to the total uncertainty of the power of the bomb.  
At 05:29:20, the Gadget (the nickname for the assembled nuclear weapon) detonated 
with a force of 21kT, exceeding the estimates by four-fold, and the structures set up 
throughout the test range were incinerated. The desert sand around the detonation was 
instantly transformed into green glass, the detonation felt over 100 miles away, and the cloud 
reached 7.5 miles in height.51 After the celebration of this overwhelmingly successful test 
wore off, Kenneth Bainbridge, the lead of the Trinity test, turned to Oppenheimer and 
somberly told him “now we are all sons of bitches.”52 More famously, Oppenheimer later 
recalled: “We knew the world would not be the same. A few people laughed, a few people 
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cried, most people were silent.” Oppenheimer says, “I remembered the line from the Hindu 
scripture, the Bhagavad-Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he should do his 
duty and to impress him, takes on his multi-armed form and says, ‘Now, I am become Death, 
the destroyer of worlds.’ I suppose we all thought that one way or another.”53 After almost 40 
years of research, Pandora’s Box had finally been opened. 
Before the test, throughout April and May, various high-level committees had begun 
meeting to discuss possible targets in Japan. Five Japanese targets were selected: Hiroshima, 
Kokura, Yokohama, Niigata, and Kyoto. After selection, US air forces ceased bombing these 
five cities so that the psychological effect would be more substantial for the Japanese. 
Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, voiced displeasure at Kyoto’s nomination as a target on 
the grounds of historical, cultural, and religious significance, as well as the fact that he had 
visited Kyoto on his honeymoon and had grown attached to the city. President Truman 
agreed with the decision to remove Kyoto from the strike list, and the seaport of Nagasaki 
was put in its place.54  
The first atomic bombing mission began on August 6, with Hiroshima set as the 
primary target, and Kokura and Nagasaki as the secondary targets. Upon arrival at Hiroshima 
from Tinian, the aircrafts involved were greeted with clear visibility of the target. Straight 
Flush, the B-29 providing weather reconnaissance for Hiroshima, advised the crew of the 
primary bomber, Enola Gay, to proceed with the bombing. The bombardier released the gun-
type bomb, Little Boy, from 31,000 feet at 8:15am to detonate 1,900 feet above the city. The 
untested bomb variant successfully yielded 16kT of energy, only fissioning 1.7% of the 
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Uranium inside, but instantly killing approximately 30% of Hiroshima’s population, or 
80,000 people.55 
While the Japanese government was stunned by the size and effect of the bomb in 
Hiroshima, they refused to meet the Allies’ demands for unconditional surrender, and 
therefore the US decided to strike again. It was decided that the target for “Fat Man”, the 
implosion-type bomb, would be the city of Kokura, the site of major Japanese munitions 
production. Due to an unfavorable weather forecast beginning on August 10th, Col Tibbets, 
the mission commander, decided to reschedule for August 9th. On the 9th Weather 
reconnaissance aircraft at both Kokura and Nagasaki, the secondary target, reported that the 
weather was ideal at their location. Bockscar, the B-29 carrying Fat Man, was supposed to 
rendezvous at an assembly point off the coast of Japan with Big Stink, the strike observation 
and photography B-29. But Big Stink was delayed, causing Bockscar to wait 30 additional 
minutes, thereby delaying the bombing.56 By the time that Bockscar arrived on station in 
Kokura, clouds and black smoke from a previous bombing raid had obscured the target, 
causing the crew to make three separate passes, placing the aircraft in the way of Japanese 
antiaircraft fire.  
 With Bockscar's fuel running low due to a mechanical issue with its fuel pump, the 
convoy decided to head for the secondary target, Nagasaki. Due to the fuel levels, the crew 
initially decided that if Nagasaki was obscured upon their arrival, they would fly back to 
Okinawa and dump the bomb in the ocean, however, en route, they optioned for bombing 
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regardless of visibility, utilizing radar.57 Once over the partly clouded target, the bombardier 
was able to visually sight the target through a break in the clouds and dropped Fat Man at 
11:01am onto a tennis court 1,650 feet above the ground.58 Fortunately for many of the 
residents, Nagasaki's location within the Urakami Valley saved much of the city as the blast 
was contained by the surrounding hills. Three days later, the Japanese emperor notified the 
imperial family that Japan would surrender, and two days later announced surrender to the 
world, citing the two atom bombs as well as the recent Soviet invasion, thus ending WWII.  
The decision by US leadership to drop the atomic bombs on Japan, killing around 
100,000 people, was defended by policymakers who argued that “defeating Japan would 
have required invading the island nation and spilling a vast quantity of American blood,”59 
possibly leaving up to an additional million dead on both sides. A land invasion accompanied 
by conventional bombings would have crippled the island of Japan more significantly than 
the two atomic bombs, likely creating an even larger humanitarian crisis. 
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 NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSFORMED 
The Japanese surrender concluded the war and accelerated the nuclear innovation age. 
The USSR's own innovation age would further drive the ever-growing role that nuclear 
power would come to play in national security. With the dropping of the first bomb on 
Hiroshima, the dimensions of national security literally changed overnight. The next segment 
of this thesis will explore how emerging technologies from the nuclear innovation age 
drastically changed the specific dimensions of national security: military, political, energy, 
economic, and environmental security.   
 
Military Security 
            Traditional military (sometimes called physical) security implies the capability of a 
state to both adequately defend itself against foreign powers while also deterring foreign 
military aggression.60 Specifically, this means that a nation’s military must protect its citizens 
through offensive (deterrence, counter-terrorism) and defensive (standing armies, anti-
ballistic missile) action. The most important role of the US government is to "provide for the 
common defense," a task that has been interpreted and executed in a variety of ways since the 
country was founded in 1787. In the 230 years of America sovereignty, leaders and 
administrations of the nation have acted against a wide range of threats to the common 
defense. 
Military security has evolved with changing warfare, but from the perspective of the 
US as a superpower, it began in the early 20th century. With the US’s rise to power in the 
                                                          






early 1900s, its military became internationally formidable and relied on “gunboat 
diplomacy” for its military security strategy. As Theodore Roosevelt liked to quote from the 
West African proverb, gunboat diplomacy was "speak softly and carry a big stick."61  This 
one-sided policy historically relied on powerful naval demonstrations to frighten weaker 
opponents into submission or neutrality. However, this form of military security is viable 
only when a single nation is substantially stronger than the others.62 In the cases of both 
WWI and WWII, the common defense of the US was attacked by nations of similar military 
caliber: German U-boats besieged US shipping in WWI and Japanese aircrafts attacked the 
US homeland in WWII. Towards the end of the devastating WWII, the US returned to 
gunboat diplomacy, dropping two atom bombs on its stubborn Japanese enemy. As the sole 
owner of nuclear weapons, the US could once again frighten weaker opponents into 
submission or neutrality. That period, however, only lasted for four years, until the USSR 
detonated their first implosion-type atom bomb.  
With help from US spies like Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, the USSR was able to 
speed up the timeline of their nuclear weapons program through the procurement of top-
secret nuclear weapons designs. “Physicist Hans Bethe estimated that the Soviets would be 
able to build their own bomb in five years, but thanks to information provided by their 
agents, they did it in four."63  When the USSR tested First Lightning on August 29, 1949, 
modern military security was born. With the US and USSR both in possession of nuclear 
weapons, the nuclear innovation age finally began, and military security took on a new 
identity. Having nuclear weapons in their possession, both had the means of carrying out 
                                                          









gunboat diplomacy, with devastating results. This new, two-sided variant of gunboat 
diplomacy colloquially became known as “mutually assured destruction,” whereby both 
countries could now speak softly and carry a big stick, while deterring their rivals from 
waging a land war against them. 
International military security evolved during the nuclear innovation age via three 
different technologies: the hydrogen bomb, ballistic missiles, and nuclear submarines. While 
the new military security strategy was “mutually assured destruction,” the atom bomb was 
not yet truly capable of "assuring destruction". In 1950, President Truman approved research 
to create an even larger nuclear weapon, called a "super," which would utilize hydrogen in 
addition to the typical elements of the atom bomb.64 The idea of a nuclear weapon using 
hydrogen as a primary ingredient was first discussed in Los Alamos during the Manhattan 
Project, but was abandoned in favor of the fission bomb. However, after the success of the 
Soviet atomic bomb, the idea of building a hydrogen bomb received new support in the US. 
For this type of bomb, deuterium and tritium (hydrogen isotopes) were fused into helium, 
thereby releasing energy. This fusion created in a hydrogen bomb mirrors the process by 
which the sun produces its energy. Due to the incredible heat required to start a fusion 
reaction, the physicists quickly realized that a fission detonation, which reaches temperatures 
exceeded 100 million degrees, would be the ideal kindling for a fusion bomb.65  
The physicists also realized that theoretically, there would be no limit to the yield of 
this weapon, as energy output could be increased until it caused significant atmospheric 
damage or global fallout. Physicists such as Oppenheimer and Fermi opposed its 
development, writing, "Since no limit exists to the destructiveness of this weapon, its 
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existence and knowledge of its construction is a danger to humanity as a whole."66  
Disregarding all warnings, the US and USSR both developed hydrogen bombs with ever-
increasing potency. Hydrogen bomb research reached its pinnacle on October 30, 1961, when 
the USSR dropped a 57mT hydrogen bomb, Tsar Bomba, which had a yield of 1500 times 
the power of the bombs dropped on Japan. Sensors registered Tsar Bomba’s shockwave 
orbiting the Earth three times and the flash from the detonation could be seen up to 630 miles 
away, or the distance from Washington D.C. to Orlando, Florida.67   
To deliver Tsar Bomba to its target, the 27-ton bomb had to be attached underneath a 
Tu-95 bomber as it was too large to fit in the bomb bay, and the pilots were only give a 50% 
chance of surviving the blast.68  With technology that could destroy a major city in seconds, 
the US and USSR both required more efficient means than an aircraft for delivering their 
massive weapons. Short range ballistic missiles had been preliminarily developed during 
WWII, and the US and USSR began pouring money into their development after the war's 
end. With the construction of the new hydrogen bomb, the USSR became the first nation to 
build a true intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), the R-7, which flew 3,700 miles in its 
first successful test, and would eventually launch both the first satellite and the first man into 
space. The US Air Force was initially uninterested in developing an ICBM due to their air 
superiority and intercontinental bombers, but after the first hydrogen bomb test by the USSR, 
the government was forced to develop the Atlas ICBM.  
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Since the two nations could not launch the missiles against one another without 
triggering global war, they sought other avenues to demonstrate their technical proficiency to 
provide for the common defense. The most peaceful and public way to demonstrate the 
capabilities and reliability of their missiles were with manned spaceflight. By placing a 
human atop their ICBM and accurately launching them into space and returning them safely, 
the US and USSR showed each other, very publicly, that they could assure the destruction of 
their rival. 
With hydrogen bombs to destroy cities and ICBMs to get them there, the US and 
USSR now needed a hidden, mobile platform from which to launch the ICBMs to avoid 
being easily targeted, and submarines were the logical answer. However, the submarine’s 
usefulness and stealth were limited by fuel consumption, constantly needing to return to base 
to refuel. Therefore, the US Navy formed the Naval Reactors Branch to devise a solution 
around fuel limitations by riding the wave of nuclear innovation.  
The Naval Reactors Branch, the Atomic Energy Commission, and Westinghouse 
Electric Corporation then came together and invent what would become the universally used 
modern nuclear reactor, under the direction of Captain Hyman Rickover.  They needed to 
miniaturize the existing reactor technology, incorporate steam generation for powering the 
submarine, and create extensive safety mechanisms to protect the sailors, all while planning 
for the unique physical limitations of operating on a submarine as well as under the ocean.69 
The complexity of this new technology is easily demonstrated through a diagram of a 
submarine’s reactor:  
                                                          







Figure 6 Pressurized-Water Naval Nuclear Propulsion System 
 
 
The necessity for innovation drove the teams to develop technology that used pressurized 
water for cooling as well as steam generation, the method still used as the primary means of 
nuclear power generation all over the world today.  
The nuclear propulsion on submarines proved to be a critical component of nuclear 
age military security. The nuclear reactor's independence from air that diesel engines 
required, meant that submarines no longer needed to surface, staying under water for 
considerably longer periods of time. Additionally, these nuclear reactors only require 
refueling approximately every 25 years, meaning that the only time they are required to 
return to port would be for food or maintenance.70 In terms of military security, the largest 
advantage of the nuclear submarine is its mobility. With traditional ICBMs, missiles are 
permanently tethered to their silos, and their poor maneuverability makes for a desirable 
target for an enemy. With nuclear submarines, the ICBMs they carry can be anywhere in the 
ocean, hidden from view of concerned nations, ever providing for the common defense.  
                                                          






This improvement of military security through nuclear innovation has had a positive 
cyclical effect internally on nations, whereby the military, private industry, and research 
institutes all work together to stimulate the economy and encourage academic pursuits at all 
levels of learning.71 Externally, however, this change in military security has led to the 
largest, most powerful, most expensive arms race in history.   
 
Political Security 
Political security has historically been defined by global stability and is based on “the 
rule of international law, the effectiveness of international political institutions, as well as 
diplomacy and negotiation between nations and other security actors.”72 However, with the 
rise of nuclear superpowers, political security has also been defined by “the capability of a 
nation-state to enforce its international policy choices by use of its military and nuclear 
capabilities.”73 This type of coercion has always played a role in political security, but with 
the rise of nuclear innovation, it has become one of the primary drivers in international 
politics.  
While military security was the national security dimension most immediately 
effected by nuclear power, the weapons also heavily affected the nature and content of 
international relations. Its rise was responsible for transforming the traditional international 
balance of power into a "balance of terror."74 While nuclear weapons have been a source of 
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“stability” and deterrence for guaranteeing military security, they have been a major source 
of instability on the international power structure. For the first few years after WWII, the US 
monopoly on atomic weapons made it the only superpower in the world, capable of 
blackmailing or pressuring any rival. When the USSR successfully developed nuclear 
weapons several years later, it led to bipolarity in international relations and the rise of two 
true superpowers. Then, with the rapid entry of Britain, France and China as nuclear powers, 
the bipolar power structure was transformed into a confusing, unstable multipolar structure.   
Before the nuclear weapons age, the international standing of a state was determined 
by elements such as geography, population, natural resources and industrial capacity. In the 
nuclear age, nuclear technology and nuclear power quickly became the only important 
factors in achieving international political power. Any state that found itself outside the 
nuclear powers list, or without a protector under a “nuclear umbrella,” found itself in 
immediate danger.75 NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is a commonly cited 
example of non-nuclear nations banding together under a nuclear umbrella, provided by the 
US, UK, and France, in an attempt to guarantee their national security under the new 
international order.76 Additionally, under the new international order, small, previously 
insignificant states were suddenly capable of becoming formidable powers in international 
politics by acquiring nuclear technology and weapons. North Korea, a nation the size of 
Mississippi, with inhospitable geography, minimal natural resources, and a weak, starving 
population, has managed to propel themselves onto the international stage through their 
procurement of nuclear technology. 
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Also, under the old system of international order, power scarcity was the common 
trend, with “nations participating in major wars against their enemies for only minor gains in 
power.”77 This traditional balance of power typically prevented large changes in the status 
quo, since there was only a finite amount of power available. Throughout Western 
civilization, several dominating nations in Europe historically controlled and manipulated the 
level of power of weaker nations, and whenever any nation tried to upset the balance or 
accumulate too much for itself, the other nations took action against the offender, typically in 
a coalition of sorts, using threat or force of war.78 More recently, throughout the 100-year 
period following Napoleon's defeat, from 1815-1914, this method successfully regulated 
international relations, for the most part, with the European powers maintaining peace 
through the threat of war, until Germany's unification and subsequent rise.  
In the nuclear age, instead of power scarcity, power surplus came to be the 
distinguishing trend. Nuclear nations came to acquire what some call an "overkill capacity," 
that is, the capacity to destroy the entire world several times over.79  Once the nuclear age 
began, no coalition of non-nuclear powers could be formed against any single nuclear power. 
Even a nuclear power found it difficult to force a balance of power against a nuclear power 
through threat of war, since such a step could have led to its own destruction. The US and 
USSR came to have an extreme level of overkill capacity, meaning they were theoretically 
capable of achieving their interests anywhere in the world in complete disregard of the 
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opinion and wishes of other states. Both began flexing their newfound total power by 
attempting intervention as a means of imposing their wishes on small nations.  
The smaller non-nuclear nations quickly came to live in a state of defenselessness, 
finding themselves powerless in securing their own interests, not only against a nuclear 
power, but against any power.80 If they pursued an interest in a manner that a nuclear power 
simply disproved of, their country could be placed in danger of annihilation. With such a 
power surplus, it was difficult to protect their people from a nuclear power, and they had no 
means to prevent nuclear blackmail, which nuclear nations could impose at any time. 
The feeling of defenselessness that consumed international relations eventually 
transformed into what some have called the "balance of terror," where nations fear one 
another's capabilities to such an extent that they have become anxious to avoid war and 
hesitant to pursue any national interest. "The fear of total destruction has acted as a blessing 
in disguise, in so far as it checked the states from thinking in terms of war."81  The balance of 
terror has created an unusual situation in international politics and indirectly helped preserve 
peace. While the nuclear age provided a power surplus to the nuclear nations, it has made the 
actual exercising of power very difficult. Since the balance of terror prevents the use of their 
nuclear weapons, nuclear powers engaged in several unsuccessful conventional proxy wars 
during the Cold War to indirectly fight each other and maintain the balance. The US was 
unable to use nuclear weapons in Vietnam and was forced to withdraw from it. Similarly, the 
USSR was forced to pull their punches against their enemies and failed to successfully 
control Afghanistan. The rise of nuclear weapons also confused politicians and diplomats. 
                                                          










“They possessed weapons of unimaginable destruction that could eliminate an enemy in 
seconds but remained unsure of the legality and public opinion toward using them.”82  
The final impact that nuclear weapons have had and continue to have on international 
relations is in the realm of international law. The basic premise of nuclear weapons subverts 
some of the fundamental tenants of international law and, at times, entirely defeats the 
purpose of having the laws. Nuclear weapons fundamentally changed the character of war 
from simple war to total war, thereby eliminating the historical difference between military 
personnel and civilians. In the new "modern" war, every person is treated as a combatant 
since nuclear weapons can't make the distinction that a human can.83 This change in warfare 
evolved into a situation in which no state could hope to use or even rely on the traditional 
laws of war.  
Advocates for humanitarian law often point to the "1977 Additional Protocol I to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions" when discussing the relationship between nuclear weapons and 
international law. The Protocol focuses heavily on the proper method for conducting 
hostilities and outlines five basic rules that describe proper warfighting. The first, and most 
important rule in the Protocol is distinction. According to distinction, members of a conflict 
may not “employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as 
required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike 
military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction.”84  Essentially, the 
rule states that, when conducting war, nations are to only focus their efforts on military 
targets and personnel, not civilians. For example, the WWII fire bombings of Dresden would 
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not be permissible under this provision. Similarly, the basic definition of a nuclear weapon is 
in direct contrast to this rule, as its goal is to destroy absolutely anything in its path. 
After the atrocities of both World Wars, a variety of weapons were explicitly 
prohibited from use in conflicts. Many of the weapons violate several of the five Protocol 
rules, but all were banned specifically because of their violation of the rule of distinction. 
This is the case with biological weapons and chemical weapons, as well as anti-personnel 
landmines and cluster munitions.85 Nuclear weapons, however, were not ever formally 
described as violators of the rule of distinction, a fact that has garnered much criticism from 
non-nuclear states and demonstrates obvious favoritism toward the nuclear states that laid 
down the post-war international rules and created their exclusive nuclear club. 
In addition to distinction, the four remaining rules relate to items such as the unlawful 
targeting of non-military buildings, precautions that minimize “incidental loss of civilian 
life," conducting warfare which causes "superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering," and 
prohibition of warfare that causes "widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the 
environment."86  Formal, diplomatic committees have constantly debated the legality of 
nuclear weapons within the context of these rules, and the general consensus is that nuclear 
weapons are clearly illegal per international law. However, no gathering of non-nuclear 
powers, no matter how large (120 currently) nor how much international power they possess, 
can force nuclear powers to give up their weapons, thus far. Nuclear weapons' most lasting 
role in international relations is to nullify the credibility of international law, giving modern 
states the ability to pick-and-choose international laws they want to follow, and disregarding 
those they disfavor.      
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 Energy, Economic, and Environmental Security       
            Energy security, “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable 
price,”87 first earned its place as a fundamental dimension of national security in the 1970s. 
“When the price of oil on world markets increased dramatically in 1973, countries which 
were major energy importers reviewed their energy policies and took steps to reduce their 
vulnerability to political and economic uncertainties.”88 With populations rapidly expanding 
and technology relying ever more on a reliable, unbroken power source, nations began 
acknowledging that energy was becoming as important as powerful militaries and robust 
economies. As the oil crisis showed, “there are significant geopolitical, economic and 
availability implications of a country relying on energy imports. Today, much of the 
internationally-traded oil and gas comes from relatively few sources, and political instability 
there or in countries traversed by pipelines is a constant risk to supplies and hence a major 
economic vulnerability.”89 For some nations, the most obvious solution to this problem was 
to invest more heavily in the extraction of fossil fuels. However, the problem with fossil fuels 
is: they only occur in certain regions of the world, they are clearly finite, and they pose a 
hazard to a nation’s environmental security. Therefore, nuclear power is the most viable 
solution for providing a nation with carbon-free, base load power.  
“It is impossible to imagine sustainable international development without an increase 
in the role of nuclear power in global energy production. Nuclear power has the potential to 
limit greenhouse gas production, to conserve fossil fuel, and to increase nations’ energy 
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independence. Without the continued improvement of nuclear power, achieving energy 
security will be much more difficult.”90 Nations like France have already converted much of 
their energy production to nuclear power, but many world powers are still relying on fossil 
fuels to power their lives while wrestling with the implications of a conversion to “green 
energy.” Green energy produced from solar and wind has seen a micro-innovation age as 
nations move toward carbon-free energy producers. However, the problem presented by solar 
and wind is their role as a non-base load power source,91 Due to the weather-based nature of 
solar and wind power generation, they cannot exclusively provide power to the grid without 
enormous batteries and long-range power lines. The basic notion of base load power is a 
topic of debate among green energy strategists, but the size and varying climates of the US 
makes a non-base load power system difficult to overcome 
 A national security dimension that closely relates to energy security is economic 
security. Economic security is the “increasing dependency on the flow of goods and services, 
people and capital, and information and technology across nation’s borders, safeguarding the 
systems that make this flow possible from exploitation by adversaries, including terrorists 
and criminals.”92 As the role of modern technology in society continues to grow, economic 
and energy security have become increasingly intertwined. For a nation to have robust energy 
security, it must rely on a strong and secure economy to provide the constant resources for 
cost-effective, highly available power. In the same way, a strong economy simply cannot 
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exist in the 21st century without stable and secure energy that is the lifeblood of the modern 
flow of goods and services internationally.   
 The newest dimension of national security that continues to grow in prominence is 
environmental security. “The security of ecosystems has attracted greater attention as the 
impact of ecological damage by humans has grown. The degradation of ecosystems, 
including topsoil erosion, deforestation, biodiversity loss, and climate change, affect 
economic security and can precipitate mass migration, leading to increased pressure on 
resources elsewhere.”93 The short-term solution that addresses part of the ongoing ecological 
degradation is clearly green energy. Simply moving away from the burning of fossil fuels to 
a carbon-free power source would make a huge impact on the overall health of the Earth. 
Companies like Tesla Motors are trying to decrease the burning of fossil fuels by building 
cars that operate on electricity stored in on-board batteries. However, unless a Tesla owner 
has solar or wind connected to their place of residence, Tesla vehicles rely almost exclusively 
on electricity produced from the burning of fossil fuels, as 76% of the US electrical grid 
comes from fossil fuels.94 
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Figure 7 Primary Energy Production by Source, 201795 
 Energy, economic, and environmental requirements will only increase in their 
reliance on nuclear power. In order to support growing energy and economic demands while 
safeguarding the environment from fossil fuels, nuclear power is a vital necessity for 
guaranteeing a nation’s national security. Both the public and private sector have 
acknowledged the need for a move away from fossil fuels to green energy, but in order to do 
this in the coming decades, solar/wind will have become the new norm with nuclear power as 
the overall backbone of the electrical grid.  
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CHAPTER V:  
 
 
FROM CAUTION TO FEAR TO COMPLACENCY 
The nuclear innovation age brought the power surplus to unstable levels, as 
superpowers were now able to destroy their enemies several times over. Governments' focus 
on nuclear innovation meant that technology continued advancing at a rapid pace, always 
with the goal of outclassing a rival power. The peak in US nuclear innovation came in the 
late 1960s, culminating in the largest-ever warhead stockpile, employing then-advanced 
technology that is still widely used in 2018. In just 10 years of increasing production at an 




Figure 8 Quantity of US Nuclear Stockpile (1945-2009) 97 
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Additionally, in 1966, the US began improvements to the third-stage of the Minuteman 
ICBM, building the Minuteman III. This upgrade improved distance and accuracy, however 
much of the justification for the upgrade was for newly developed technology called, 
“multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicles,” or MIRVs. Upon re-entry, the MIRVs 
would separate from the top of the missile and direct toward separate targets, decreasing the 
number of missiles necessary to fire. Specifically, MIRVs would be used to reduce collateral 
damage "by matching the yield to the target."98 Since MIRVs could accurately hit point 
targets, such as a missile base or silo, only a small nuclear warhead would be necessary to 
achieve the anticipated destruction. Collateral damage, therefore, would be significantly 
reduced from the destruction caused by larger warheads. 
The 1970s were a period of stagnation in nuclear innovation, with decreases in 
quantities of warheads, as well as lower production of new missile systems. While the 
innovation slowed, the US government's support for the nuclear community remained high as 
the Cold War continued. However, the first signs that the nuclear innovation age's end was in 
sight appeared in 1979. (The next several pages will attempt to simplify extremely complex 
nuclear reactor functions down to paragraphs with some amplifying notes, but in summary, 
nuclear reactors are dangerous when poorly designed or poorly attended it.) 
Around 4:00am on March 28, 1979, a mechanical failure in the main feedwater 
pumps for the secondary system's steam generators caused an automatic shutdown of the 
turbine-generator and reactor in Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 
Middletown, Pennsylvania.99 The rapid shutdown led to a quick increase in pressure in the 
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primary system, and plant technicians responded by opening the pressure relief valve to 
correct the issue. However, the pressure relief valve became stuck open, while the main 
control panel showed it had re-closed, not indicating that cooling water was now pouring out 
the relief valve. The stuck valve then caused the system to lose so much pressure that the 
coolant levels were lowered, and the reactor core began overheating. The heat from the core 
melted the Zirconium plating on the Uranium fuel and the incident was officially declared a 
"severe core meltdown," the 2nd most severe accident rating on the nuclear regulatory 
commission's (NRC), meltdown scale.100  
Fortunately, the reactor vessel remained intact, which meant the external effects were 
low, and there was no detectable health effect on the workers or local populace.101 However, 
the entire nuclear community, regardless of their affiliation, was now under intense scrutiny. 
The mechanical and safety failures that allowed the meltdown to occur brought public 
skepticism upon the nuclear industry, and people were reminded of the dangers that radiation 
and nuclear power posed if not handled properly. Because of the increase in public fear and 
distrust, the NRC's regulations and oversight became broader, stricter and more robust, with 
the operation and constructing of nuclear plants becoming highly politicized and 
bureaucratic. Large-scale changes, because of the meltdown, led to both increased reactor 
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safety and the end of much of the government and public’s support of the nuclear 
community.  
The next nail in the coffin of the nuclear innovation age was a more global event, one 
that horrified the international community and helped lead to the collapse of a superpower. In 
the early morning of April 26, 1986, undertrained workers conducted a poorly planned test in 
Unit 2 of the Chernobyl power plant in modern-day Ukraine. Before a routine shutdown was 
scheduled to occur late on the 26th, the workers at the plant decided to conduct a test to 
determine the reactor's behavior during an unscheduled power loss.102 The workers had to 
make several changes to the reactor configuration before beginning, famously disabling the 
automatic shutdown feature on the system in order to run the system at lower power.  
The test first required that the reactor run at very low power levels before the power 
was actually shut off, an unadvisable requirement due to previously identified concerns with 
the design, but the crew decided to proceed with the test anyway.103 Initially, the reactor, 
which was only running at 50% power (approximately 1500 MW), began plummeting in 
power once the test began, dropping down to 30 MW and making the reactor highly unstable. 
The shift leader called off the test due to safety concerns, but the deputy chief engineer 
overrode him, and approximately 30 minutes later, managed to stabilize the reactor at 200 
MW.104 
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As the workers shut down the power, and the turbine for the water pumps began 
slowing while they waited for the backup generators to start, the water pumps began 
pumping with irregular power, creating bubbles in the system. The presence of the bubbles 
meant there was less overall coolant in the system to absorb neutrons, and the workers 
suddenly noticed a spike in power. Until this point, the computer had been compensating for 
the bubbles, adjusting appropriately. However, possibly scared by the sudden spike in power, 
a worker initiated the emergency shutdown, causing the system to automatically insert every 
control rod simultaneously.105 At this point, the blame for the accident is shifted from the 
operators to the faulty reactor design. Among its many design flaws, the largest flaw with the 
Chernobyl reactor (an RBMK) was that the control rods had graphite moderators attached to 
their tip to help the reactor increase power as it was starting up and when the rods were being 
withdrawn. With the rods now being inserted in an emergency situation, there was another 
power spike due to the introduction of the graphite into the system. Before the control rods 
could be fully inserted, thereby shutting down the reactor, the core began overheating, 
causing fuel rods to break apart and block the control rod tunnel, leaving them only one-third 
inserted, and their graphite tips exposed, raising the power output in the reactor to 5300 MW. 
The further power increase led to temperatures and pressures high enough to rupture 
the fuel channels and introduce the overheated fuel to the water coolant, which immediately 
flashed to steam. The flashing of the water to steam rocketed the power output in the reactor 
from 5300 MW to 33,000 MW, ten times the normal operational output.106 This rapid 
increase caused a steam explosion that tore off the 1000-ton reactor lid and sent it through the 
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roof of the building. This explosion also further ruptured the fuel channels as well as severed 
the coolant lines, causing the remaining coolant to flash to steam.  
This explanation of the first explosion has been the scientifically accepted 
explanation for the Chernobyl meltdown for the last 32 years. However, in November 2017, 
a Swedish report was published that speculates that the first explosion may have actually 
been nuclear. The report presented three pieces of evidence which gives credibility to the 
claim that the explosion was nuclear: isotopes found further north than a steam explosion 
could have propelled them, temperatures hot enough to melt the two-meter thick bottom 
reactor plate, and a reported “bright blue flash” observed at the time of the explosion, 
characteristic of nuclear reactions.107 While the nature of the explosion does not change the 
fact that it occurred, it does place even more fear and skepticism on the nuclear industry and 
its ability to conduct operations safely.  
Approximately three seconds after the first explosion (whether it be nuclear or 
steam), a second, larger explosion occurred, destroying the remainder of the reactor core and 
ending the nuclear chain reaction. This explosion caused numerous large-scale fires to break 
out throughout the building. The fires, in conjunction with the now-open roof, were a major 
cause of the widespread radiation that occurred, with the updraft from the powerful fires 
further propelling the radiation upward into the atmosphere.  
The accident caused the "largest uncontrolled radioactive release into the 
environment ever recorded for any civilian operation," and large quantities of radioactive 
substances were released into the air for about 10 days.108 The Chernobyl accident's severe 
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radiation effects killed 29 of the site's 600 workers in the first four months after the event. 
Another 106 workers received high enough doses to cause acute radiation sickness, two 
technicians died directly from the explosion and the falling debris in the control room, and 
another 200,000 cleanup workers in 1986 and 1987 received toxic doses of between 1 and 
100 rem.109 
The events at Chernobyl caused a shift, from fear toward nuclear power to one of 
horror and hatred, with some European nations outright banning any nuclear power 
production in their nation in the aftermath. The international community witnessed another 
example of the dangers of nuclear power if not properly controlled, and it terrified them. This 
disaster, however, was not quite the end of the nuclear innovation age, but some think that it 
ultimately led to it. 
"The Chernobyl explosion was perhaps the real cause of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union." While this phrase may sound absurd and contrary to common history, it was uttered 
by the man that ended up dismantling the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev.110 According to 
Gorbachev, the Chernobyl explosion was a “turning point” that “opened the possibility of 
much greater freedom of expression, to the point that the system as we knew it could no 
longer continue.” Chernobyl, represented a transition in the relationship between the Soviet 
public and the government. Before the explosion, most Soviets were not yet discontented 
dissidents; “they believed in the Soviet system, forgave its flaws, and hoped for a better 
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future within its confines.”111 But after Chernobyl, the system seemed scary, unredeemable, 
and entirely unsafe. For them, it represented everything the Soviet Union was becoming, and 
their hope for Soviet prosperity went up in flames with Chernobyl.  
Once the Warsaw Pact dissolved and the USSR disbanded, the nuclear innovation age 
was officially over, and the US was once again the sole superpower. Following the collapse 
of the USSR, the role of nuclear weapons in national security decreased immediately, due to 
an overwhelming lack of support for innovation. The US then turned to security in 
international relations through more traditional means, focusing on economy and trade deals, 
while national defense became focused on terrorism, with the nation’s common defense 
under attack from an untraditional enemy.  
 The first indication that nuclear innovation in the US ended was the dramatic drop in 
the Department of Defense’s expenditure on nuclear weapons. Spending was at the highest 
during the peak of US innovation, when the Minuteman III and MIRVs were coming online 
in the 1960s. After dipping back down, spending spiked again in the early 1980s as tension 
with the USSR was approaching a high. After the Chernobyl explosion, there is a very clear, 
rapid downward trend in spending, from 11% to around 3% in only a decade, signaling the 
fall.  
Next, global nuclear warhead inventory was dramatically reduced, which had the 
most immediate effect in ending the nuclear innovation age. As the USSR began its decline 
as a direct result of Chernobyl, the global stockpile was impacted by this transition.  
                                                          






Figure 9 US DoD Nuclear Weapons Expenditures112 
 
Furthermore, arms reduction treaties like SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) I and II 
began to break down the rate of innovation, and the superpowers were now contractually 
obligated to slow innovation by limiting the quantity and capabilities of their nuclear 
technologies. Nations began addressing the absurdity of the stockpile sizes and capabilities, 
and while it was put in place as a measure to de-escalate, it greatly weakened the US nuclear 
infrastructure and community.  
 
 
Figure 10 Estimated Global Warhead Inventories (1945-2016)113 
                                                          






Finally, the category most negatively affected by the end of government-sponsored 
nuclear innovation was nuclear reactor construction. The global number of “completed and 
ongoing projects” went from around 200 in 1980, to 60 in 1990, to 30 in 2000, and to 1 in 
2010114. The industry has begun to make a small recovery with the start of the Asian 
innovation age that began around 2010, but the combination of fear and complacency has 
taken a heavy toll on the nuclear reactor industry.  
 
 
Figure 11 Reactors "Under Construction"115 
 
The Wrath of Khan 
With the Cold War over and global focus temporarily shifted away from nuclear 
energy, a power vacuum of sorts began. A cabal of rogue states became interested in 
acquiring nuclear weapons programs as a means of national defense as well as legitimizing 
their existence on the world stage. This second nuclear innovation age, the “rogue innovation 
age,” began as a result to India’s successful nuclear weapon test in 1974. Pakistan, India’s 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
113 Kristensen, "United States Discloses Size of Nuclear Weapons Stockpile." 
114 "Plans For New Reactors Worldwide,"  (World Nuclear Association, January 2018). http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/plans-for-new-reactors-worldwide.aspx. 
 






bitter rival and neighbor, feared that an Indian nuclear weapon would mean their destruction, 
but found their security through a Pakistani metallurgical engineer working in The 
Netherlands making nuclear centrifuges, who would become the father of the rogue 
innovation age.116 Abdul Qadeer (A.Q.) Khan recognized the danger that his country faced 
and stole classified schematics for highly advanced centrifuges from his employer, 
URENCO, returning to Pakistan with them, ready to build a bomb. In July 1976, Khan 
founded the Engineering Research Laboratories to set up and operate a centrifuge plant using 
the URENCO designs.117 Raw Uranium was to be mined locally in Pakistan, converted to gas 
(Uranium hexafluoride), and sent to Khan’s centrifuges. Khan, recognizing the size of the 
operation, purchased land, hired over 10,000 employees, and personally laid down the 
Pakistani national plan for procuring a nuclear weapon.  
 Famously, Khan also leveraged European contacts he had made both while in 
Academia and working for URENCO. He set up a continent-wide network for purchasing 
highly technical components that he could not easily manufacture or buy in Pakistan.118 In 
the late 1970s, the export laws in Europe were much looser and more ambiguous than those 
in the US. For example, an unauthorized entity was not permitted by law to purchase an 
assembled centrifuge, but anyone could easily purchase the required parts and assemble it 
themselves.119  
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“Complete centrifuge units were listed, and could only be exported to IAEA 
safeguarded facilities, which the Pakistani enrichment plant was not. High-vacuum valves 
were not listed, even if expressly intended for a centrifuge enrichment unit. The valves might 
be necessary to the centrifuge, but, in the logic of the list, they were not “sensitive.”120 Khan 
began placing large orders of the required parts from specific companies around Europe. 
Many of the governments, where these companies were located, began protesting the selling 
of nuclear-related components to the Pakistani, but law prevented them from actually doing 
anything. By the time Chernobyl melted down, Khan had a fully operation nuclear supply 
chain, capable of producing complete nuclear weapons. 
 Khan then began the process of exporting his technologies and designs to other rogue 
nations looking to develop nuclear programs. Iran, North Korea, and Libya were all 
beneficiaries of Khan’s nuclear network, developing nuclear networks of their own to some 
degree, with North Korea being the most successful thus far.121 During the rogue innovation 
age, the US attempted to gain international support through several avenues, but proved 
mostly unsuccessful. States, many of who were close allies, were hesitant to help the US due 
to the obvious and unfair double standard that was perceived, as the US demanded nations 
give up their nuclear programs while maintaining a 30,000-warhead stockpile. 
 Just like the first age, this interim nuclear innovation age had a major effect on 
national security. The international community now had to face the possibility of nuclear 
weapons falling into the hands of unstable, irrational actors, who may randomly launch an 
attack or even sell nuclear weapons to non-government actors, such as radical Islamic 
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terrorist groups.122 Since MAD didn’t apply to new actors pursuing nuclear weapons, the US 
had to seek alternate means of national defense. The government sought military options 
though avenues like missile defense by withdrawing from the 1972 ABM treaty in 2002.123 
They also sought national defense through economic sanctions on the rouge states, but the 
sanctions only emboldening nations like Pakistan and North Korea.  
In international relations, the US government was shocked to find that their nuclear 
blackmail was becoming less effective against rogue states acquiring nuclear weapons. It 
could no longer order around the smaller, weak nations that were now developing nuclear 
capabilities of their own. The new multipolar world continued growing more multipolar as 
nations tested nuclear weapons and tested the boundaries of international acceptance.124 
 As Pakistan was helping fill the power vacuum of innovation, the US infrastructure 
and supply chain was slowly sliding into a state of disrepair. Much of the infrastructure that 
supports the US nuclear weapons programs, including labs, production facilities, and 
weapons storage complexes have recently passed their sixty-year anniversary. Neither the 
general public nor the government in the last several decades has demonstrated any interest 
in the task of maintaining the vast, complex nuclear infrastructure. With prolonged wars in 
the Middle East, and low oil and natural gas prices, the US has been able to ignore the 
crumbling nuclear infrastructure. The disaster at Fukishima in 2011, and the occasional 
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nuclear tests by North Korea serves to remind the public of the existence of nuclear power, 
but the interest ends there.  
The complacency of US leadership has translated into a “$3.7 billion backlog in 
deferred essential repairs to the US nuclear weapons infrastructure.”125 Many of the facilities 
“date to the Eisenhower Administration and, in some cases, the Manhattan Project era,” 
Frank Klotz, the administrator of the NNSA recently stated, “I can think of no greater threat 
to the nuclear security enterprise than the state of NNSA’s infrastructure.”126 In the 21st 
century, the most significant threat to US national security comes from apathy toward 
crumbling infrastructure and an unwillingness to repair it. Because of it, the capability to 
produce nuclear weapons has been substantially degraded, as well as the capability to 
efficiently produce baseload nuclear power. 
 Aside from infrastructure, the complacency has also affected the nation’s aging 
weapon stockpile. It has been 25 years since the US tested a nuclear weapon.127 The nuclear 
test ban was a beneficial treaty for the environment and international stability, but the nuclear 
programs of the signatories have been significantly impacted by it. The absence of nuclear 
innovation in the US means that much of the offensive nuclear capability is frozen in time, 
stuck in the 1970s and 1980s. Strategists and politicians have suggested a complete redesign 
of the US nuclear warheads over the decades, however the foreseeable dilemma with this 
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proposal is an inability to test these warheads.128 Under current standards, all nuclear testing 
the US conducts is on supercomputers, through modeling. The Minuteman III missiles have 
been updated and maintained, but they still contain components from the 1960s, when they 
were first built. With such old technology, many have asked whether a nuclear-loaded 
Minuteman III would truly work as intended if fired on an enemy during war. Complacency 
and apathy toward a vital component of the nation’s safety have placed the state on a path for 
disastrous consequences.  
 With the drastic decrease in budget, the government can no longer afford to divvy up 
its nuclear resources; it must pick them carefully. About 75% of the nuclear budget is for 
operations and maintenance, rather than development, modernization and enhancement.129 A 
report from the Government Accountability Office found that the Pentagon's Strategic 
Automated Command and Control System, which "coordinates the operational functions of 
the US' nuclear forces, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear bombers – runs 
on an IBM Series/1 Computer, first introduced in 1976.”130 Furthermore, the complacency 
and lack of innovation has led to "low morale, understaffing and equipment shortages" 
throughout the nuclear enterprise. In 2014, reports brought to light that "three nuclear bases 
had only one special wrench that's needed to put nuclear warheads on missiles, and they had 
to share the wrench between bases.” 
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The degradation of US nuclear technology reached such a critical point that Stephen 
Wilson, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, testified in August 2017 before Congress 
that, “the stark choice the US faces today is not between modernizing these systems or 
continued life extension programs, the choice is between modernization or losing these 
foundational capabilities starting in as early as the late-2020s.”131 In summary, General 
Wilson is saying that the US can either redesign the entire nuclear triad, or lose it, and there 
is no middle ground. The Cold War silos in rural Wyoming and North Dakota have become a 
point of shame for US policymakers and strategists that are literally watching US power 
decay in the form of 1970s IBM computers and floppy disks.   
                                                          
131 Russ Read, "Top Generals Warn The US Nuclear Arsenal Is Dangerously Outdated," (The Daily Caller 










At the turn of the 21st century, two Asian powers that historically relied on traditional 
defense ideas, began their rise to superpower status. China and India both rely on their 
enormous populations to field massive armies in pursuit of their common defense, but have 
begun transitioning away from that strategy, realizing the necessity for nuclear innovation as 
a national interest. While the two have possessed nuclear programs for several decades, both 
are in the midst of their own nuclear innovation age, accelerating at a rapid rate. “There is a 
growing belief that China and India’s rising geopolitical rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region 
combined with their efforts to build diverse and sophisticated deterrent forces could 
potentially produce security dilemmas and an arms race similar to the one that enveloped the 
superpower rivalry during the Cold War.”132 The nuclear competition between India and 
China has been described as the “epicenter of the second nuclear age,” as both countries 
work to improve nuclear programs that can guarantee their national security.133 Historically, 
the only nuclear rivalry in the Pacific has been the India-Pakistan relationship. However, 
there is evidence that nuclear innovation within China and India is changing global national 
security.  
The rivalry has been traditionally overlooked due to the presence of “louder” actors in 
the region drawing more attention to themselves, namely North Korea and Pakistan. The 
India-China “rivalry is rooted in geopolitical concerns that relate to borders, the security of 
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the sea-lanes of communications, and military assistance to third parties, as much as in China 
and India’s self-identification as peer competitors and regional hegemonic powers.”134 Since 
the inception of both the nations’ nuclear programs, the consistent theme has been “catch 
up,” with both powers devoting their resources to developing the same technology that the 
more advanced powers already possess. However, as they have begun devoting more assets 
and resources to military and civilian nuclear programs, they are on the cusp of taking the 
high ground in nuclear technology.  
 
China 
For China, their past nuclear developments and modernizations have always been 
geared toward the US, its Asian allies, and neighboring USSR/Russia, with India existing 
only as an afterthought in Chinese national security priorities.135 While the two nations 
fought over a border dispute for 32 days in 1962, China remains unconcerned about Indian 
military power. China has dealt with India primarily by assisting Pakistan in their nuclear 
development efforts, and not much else. However, as the Indo-Pacific region has become 
more significant to geopolitics and global economy in the 21st century, China has recently 
begun viewing India as more of a threat than they have in the past. The three primary sources 
of Chinese unease and rivalry with India are: “(1) control over the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR); (2) the security of the Sea-Lanes of Communications straddling the Indian Ocean 
region through which the bulk of Chinese global trade and energy supplies traverse; and (3) 
India’s participation in US plans to potentially contain or at least check Chinese power in 
Asia and the western Pacific. These three points of contention have become security concerns 
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for China that require their attention, truly putting India in their crosshairs for the first 
time.”136 
With the dawn of the second nuclear age, both China and India are becoming 
increasingly aware of the weaknesses in their nuclear programs. India aside, China has 
realized that its capabilities remain incredibly vulnerable to the US and Russia. With “the 
growing professionalization of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army – China’s Department of 
Defense), the greater availability of funds, and the maturing of technological programs 
launched in the 1980s and 1990s, China has launched a broad campaign for nuclear 
innovation.”137 Their intention is to use nuclear innovation to bolster national defense and 
international security, and in turn, utilize the robust nuclear community created by that 
innovation to better improve and solidify their energy self-sufficiency.  
 To provide context, in 2008, China’s nuclear arsenal was assessed as consisting of no 
more than 151 nuclear warheads, obsolete nuclear bombers, and a submarine fleet believed to 
operate without its complement of ballistic missiles.138 Until the early 2000s, China still 
deployed liquid-fuel missiles and stored the warheads separately from the missile systems, 
making a missile launch a “prolonged and detectable process.”139 Additionally, the Chinese 
had a very weak early warning system that left the large Chinese mainland highly vulnerable 
to an attack. The underwhelming capabilities of such a major power have been largely 
attributed to the first and second generation of leadership in China, with Mao outlining a 
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“minimum” deterrence posture that gave China just enough nuclear firepower to deter an 
attack, while not being a legitimate “nuclear power.”  
 The newer generations of leadership in China have seen the weaknesses of past 
policies and current technologies and introduced radical change. The late 1980s and 1990s 
saw an overhaul of nuclear doctrine and the establishment of a legitimate Chinese nuclear 
community that could begin the process of innovation.140 The first step was modernizing 
their delivery systems, replacing the liquid-fueled missiles with solid fuel, improving missile 
ranges by several-fold, developing sea-based missiles, and implementing MIRV technology 
in their missiles. Nuclear innovation, that has taken place in the Second Artillery Corps of the 
Chinese military, was legitimized by transforming into People’s Liberation Army Rocket 
Force (PLARF), solidifying China’s resolve toward nuclear weapons, and placing them on 
the same strategic level as the Chinese Army, Navy and Air Force.141 China’s nuclear 
weapon innovation has gone so far as to lead the global development of hypersonic glide 
vehicles (HGVs), small, highly maneuverable nuclear vehicles designed to penetrate any 
nation’s missile defense system. While missile delivery systems are not strictly a facet of 
“nuclear innovation,” HGVs are a game-changing element in the future of nuclear deterrence.  
China’s official nuclear weapons policy is one of defensive “no first use” (NFU). 
China will “not use atomic weapons against any non-nuclear states and would only use 
atomic weapons to retaliate after a nuclear first strike against China.”142 NFU was originally 
put in place in response to what China perceived as American nuclear blackmail. 
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Additionally, by adopting a NFU, China was seen as the more rational or stable nuclear 
power, viewed as a "leader" to the non-aligned world, which was its’ intentions when it 
developed the policy in 1960s. Also, due to the nation’s economic and technological 
limitations at the time, in conjunction with a smaller arsenal, NFU just made a lot of sense.  
Having a NFU policy makes China seem less much less aggressive to other countries 
when compared to the US and Russia. On numerous occasions, they have publicly declared 
that their nuclear force is simply a deterrent retaliatory force, and they would never be the 
first to use nuclear weapons “at any time and in any circumstance.”143 However, Chinese 
analysts have been calling for China to abandon the unconditional NFU in favor of 
conditional first strike. “Some believe that NFU reduces the credibility of China’s already 
small nuclear forces, and that abandoning NFU may enhance China’s nuclear deterrent. 
Abandoning NFU, they argue, is the most cost-effective way to free up scarce resources from 
defending China’s vital strategic targets for offensive capabilities to realize China’s primary 
strategic objectives.”144 The Chinese development of the HGV, essentially a stealth warhead 
designed to penetrate radars and ABM systems, hint at the possibility of an abandonment of 
the NFU policy, once they possess more advanced technology ideal for a first strike.  
The two biggest concerns that NFU brings up regarding US interests in the Trans-
Pacific region is Taiwan and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in 
Korea. Some scholars have questioned the applicability of Chinese nuclear weapons against 
Taiwan, “as it may be interpreted strictly as a domestic issue unconstrained by NFU.”145 As 
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an important US partner in the region, it is critical to note that China may be willing to 
conduct a nuclear first strike on Taiwan without officially departing from their NFU policy. 
Secondly, the US development of anti-ballistic missile THAAD systems will eventually drive 
Chinese efforts to end NFU.146 When the US and South Korea began working on an 
arrangement to install the system on the Korea peninsula to deter North Korea, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping said that, “the U.S. deployment of an advanced anti-missile system in 
South Korea gravely harms the strategic security interests of China, Russia and other 
countries in the region.” With the THAAD deployment in South Korea, from China's 
perspective, it becomes harder and harder to guarantee their ability to maintain a credible 
second-strike capability, making preemptive strike a more valid option, and undercutting the 
stability that NFU brings. 
 Finally, the innovation of nuclear weapons inevitably focused innovation on civilian 
power generation. The majority of China's electricity is produced through fossil fuels, 
predominantly from coal – 73% in 2015.147 Rapid growth in energy demands due to a 
continuously growing population, general urbanization, and industrialization, gave rise to 
power shortages, and near-exclusive reliance on fossil fuels that has led to some of the worst 
air pollution in the world.148 The World Bank estimates the economic loss due to pollution 
from fossil fuels at almost 6% of GDP, and the current leadership, under President Xi 
Jinping, has prioritized alternative energy sources. Wind and solar have been a point of 
emphasis for the new government, however, due to a poor power grid, many new projects 
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have been put on hold or altogether cancelled. The necessity of having wind and solar in 
mostly unpopulated areas requires a robust power grid to transfer the power over massive 
areas of mainland China. However, in the coastal areas of China, where most of the 
population centers lie, nuclear power has been developing rapidly. China initially used 
mostly French nuclear technology to build its first generations of reactors, but in its push for 
nuclear innovation, began developing its own reactor designs, with the goal of nuclear export 
capabilities.149  
Prior to 2008, the government had initially planned to increase nuclear capacity to 40 
GWe by 2020, with a further 18 GWe under construction.150 However, projections for 
nuclear power then increased to 70-80 GWe by 2020, 200 GWe by 2030, and 400-500 GWe 
by 2050. In April 2015 the Chinese Nuclear Energy Administration (CNEA) declared that by 
2030, actual installed nuclear capacity would be 160 GWe, providing 10% of all Chinese 
electricity, and by 2050, an installed nuclear capacity 240 GWe would provide 15% of 
electricity, decreasing coal to 50.5%.151  
In December 2011, CNEA said that China would make nuclear energy the foundation 
of its power-generation system in the next "10 to 20 years,” focusing on capacity and 
emerging technologies. The CNEA confirmed that China could manufacture eight full sets of 
reactor equipment per year, and in 2014 it confidently announced that China was aiming for 
world leadership in nuclear technology. To put things into perspective, in 1995, the US 
nuclear power industry produced approximately 100 GWe from 109 reactors, and China 
produced 2.1 GWe from 3 reactors. In 2017, the US produced 99 GWe from 99 reactors with 
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two additional reactors stalled under construction, while China produced approximately 40 
GWe from 38 reactors, with 20 more under construction.152 In China, almost 70% (865 
GWe) of its power plants were built within the last decade, whereas in the US, approximately 
half of the infrastructure (580 GWe) is over 30 years old. 
 
 
Figure 12 Projected Nuclear Electricity Generation (2010-2040)153 
 
The massive shift in China toward nuclear innovation demonstrates just how much of 
a factor nuclear power is playing in 21st century national security. While Russia has been the 
primary rival of the US since the end of WWII, China’s nuclear capabilities are on a trend 
that already appears dangerous for US national security. While China’s nuclear innovation 
age is still in its very early stages, once the government perfects their strategies, it will be 
nearly impossible for the US or any nuclear power to compete with China’s first-rate 
industrial capabilities and economy.  
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For India, China has long been a major focus of national security concern. “India’s 
nuclear quest was triggered by the humiliating defeat of its military during the 1962 war with 
China along the Himalayan border, not by a rivalry with Pakistan.”154 While India believes 
an immediate nuclear threat comes from Pakistan, India’s national security apparatus 
maintains that the real long-term threat comes from China. A major concern for India is that, 
in the China–India rivalry, nuclear innovation clearly favors China. China has already 
developed three generations of nuclear warheads – fission, thermonuclear and enhanced 
radiation. China has tested and “may” possess tactical nuclear weapons, has a four-decade 
lead over India in the development, deployment, and operations of ballistic missiles, and has 
procedures and training protocols for deployment and use of nuclear weapons.155 While 
China has historically remained behind the curve in nuclear innovation, they still possess a 
nuclear infrastructure and community. 
With India’s formal declaration as a nuclear state in 1998, its leaders have realized 
that India must dramatically improve its nuclear capabilities to prevent becoming a victim of 
nuclear blackmail by its neighbors. “The growing institutionalization of the professional 
military’s role in policy planning has also led to the realization that symbolic capabilities are 
likely to produce deterrence failures.”156 India has relied heavily on nuclear demonstrations 
to guarantee their national security, calculating that nations will be deterred from attacking 
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them simply due to their possession of nuclear weapons. However, their nuclear capability is 
so outdated that a demonstration is essentially the extent of their capabilities. Like China, 
past political leaders pushed ideology that favored minimal operational capabilities, with a 
primarily political role for nuclear weapons over a warfighting one.157  
India’s 15-year role as a “nuclear fence sitter” existed because its’ nuclear weapons 
program was run by civilian scientists, instead of military leaders. Concerned about public 
perception, Indian political leadership heavily limited nuclear technology that the civilian 
nuclear community was permitted to pursue, instead choosing to rely on demonstrations to 
display their possession of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, since India is not a signatory of 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), there was significant international pressure, mainly from 
the US, to prevent India from acquiring any dual-use technology.158 International pressure 
forced the Indian government to bury many elements of their program in order to maintain 
relations with the international community. Due to the complete lack of assistance from 
external actors, severe design flaws made their way into the Indian program, and because of 
the moratorium on testing, the scientists had difficulty properly addressing the problems.  
Like the Chinese’s Second Artillery Corps, India finally placed their nuclear program 
under military control in 2002, four years after officially declaring itself a nuclear state. This 
transfer from civilian to military control released its nuclear program from the difficulties 
brought on by secrecy and isolation. The introduction of the military into the nuclear 
program also shifted the focus from an unsubstantial gunboat diplomacy strategy to a focus 
on technical numbers and statistical damage.  
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Since 1998, light, rugged fission bombs have been the backbone of India’s nuclear 
arsenal. On several occasions, Indian scientists have claimed to possess thermonuclear 
weapons, however, their claims have been proven inaccurate. Since officially outlining their 
nuclear triad in 1999, India’s military has relied most heavily on the air component, although 
they lack the actual range to conduct effective attacks against Chinese targets without 
modern airframes and tankers. Since establishing their triad, the Indian military has invested 
heavily in developing more advanced missile systems and sea-based capabilities, in order to 
maintain relevancy in the 21st century. As their focus on innovation continues to intensify, 
they have devoted significant resources to a land-based ICBM, moving away from reliance 
on Cold War aircraft. Focus on ICBMs, of which they have developed three, “afford 
advantages of longer ranges, easier storage, maintenance and mobility.”159 
Much of the early nuclear innovation that began in India, however, was only at a 
strategic and doctrinal level, not at an actual scientific level. Due to a number of complicated 
laws and agreements, any forward movement for the Indian nuclear program was severely 
impaired. In response to the first Indian nuclear test in 1974, an organization called the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was founded by Canada, West Germany, France, Japan, the 
USSR, the UK and the US to further limit the sale of dual-use nuclear technology to specific 
nations. For India, this agreement made any future development and innovation extremely 
difficult, as well as isolating them from the nuclear powers.  
In late 2008, this all changed for India when the US, under President Bush’s 
direction, organized an international effort to release India from their ban from nuclear 
technology. In order to allow India the ability to purchase much-needed technologies, while 
maintaining the integrity of the international laws, the IAEA granted an unprecedented 
                                                          





safeguards agreement to India. The IAEA would conduct routine inspections of Indian 
nuclear sites, and in exchange, would allow international civilian nuclear cooperation. 
Additionally, the US approached the NSG to grant India a waiver to resume civilian nuclear 
trading. The group agreed to the waiver, making India the only non-NPT signatory with 
permission to conduct legitimate nuclear commerce. Due to the nature and size of such an 
agreement, the details are still being actively negotiated, with unsurprising push-back from 
China on India’s waiver. However, while all the regulations have not yet been lifted, with 
most of the import/export bans gone, India could officially and legally begin their nuclear 
innovation age.  
China has focused on nuclear innovation to further national defense and international 
relations, while India is far more interested in using nuclear innovation to guarantee their 
self-sufficiency, evidenced by the fact that the majority of their modern nuclear innovation 
has come in the form of nuclear reactors. In 2017, British Petroleum projected India’s energy 
consumption rising by 129% between 2015 and 2035, with a very heavy reliance on fossil 
fuels (86%).160 This 129% increase does not take into account that, in 2014, 20% or 260 
million Indians still did not have access to electricity, putting the nation at the same energy 
availability level as Yemen and Ghana.161 The power crisis in India hit its peak in July 2012 
when India’s Northern power grid failed while carrying a full load in the early morning. The 
following day, the Northern grid plus parts of two other grids failed, causing over 600 
million people, or 11% of the entire world’s population, to be without power. 
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The government began taking action and penned the nation’s 12th five-year plan for 
2012-17, which included the addition of 94 GWe of power, costing $247 billion. The 
International Atomic Energy Agency predicts that India will need $1.6 trillion of investment 
in power generation, transmission and distribution to meet 2035 estimates.162 In addition to 
the aging power infrastructure, the nation’s shortage of fossil fuels is driving the need for 
nuclear innovation, as the government has set a 25% nuclear power goal for 2050, when 
1094 GWe of total base-load capacity is expected to be required.163 In May 2017, the 
government approved the construction of ten 700 MWe reactors in addition to the 6 already 
under construction. 
 
Figure 13 Indian Nuclear Power Capacity164 
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Unfortunately, India is a country almost entirely void of the Uranium required to 
produce nuclear power, making massive fuel imports a necessary evil for the nation. While 
the Indian engineers work to provide a viable, reliable power grid for the nation, scientists 
are working on their nation’s resource problem. India’s nuclear innovation has come in the 
form of alternative fuel sources. Due to the lack of Uranium, scientists have been forced to 
look at different nuclear fuel sources to power their reactors and achieve self-sufficiency. The 
fast breeder reactor (FBR) at Kalpakkam is part their nuclear innovation toward self-
sufficiency.  
After 15 years of conceptualizing, experimenting, and testing, India is on the verge of 
accomplishing what no nation has ever done, they will begin generating nuclear power for 
widespread civilian use without Uranium. In 1899, approximately 60 years after the 
discovery of a black rock named Thorium, Ernest Rutherford discovered that this rock had 
unique radioactive properties. Physicists discovered that Thorium and Uranium had almost 
identical properties, and that, when Thorium-232 absorbed a neutron, after transitioning to 
Thorium-233 and Protactinium-233, it decayed to Uranium-233 (U-233) after 27 days.165 
During the Manhattan project, physicist Glenn Seaborg, famous for his discovery of 
Plutonium, discovered that U-233 fell into the exclusive category of fissile isotopes, 
alongside U-235 and Plutonium-239. However, the weapons designers quickly ruled out U-
233 as a possibility for a bomb due to its instability in an uncontained environment and the 
possibility for intense gamma radiation.  
After the conclusion of the WWII, the new US Air Force was envious of the Navy’s 
pressurized water reactor and called upon the nuclear community to build an unpressurized, 
                                                          






safer nuclear reactor that could power its long-range strategic bombers. Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory undertook the project and created a 7.4MW test reactor that used Thorium as its 
primary fuel.166 Instead of water, the reactor used air that was blown over radiators, in 
conjunction with a system that cooled and recirculated the liquid nuclear fuel as its cooling 
systems. This eliminated the need for unsafe high pressures. Additionally, due to new designs 
combined with the unpressurized nature of the reactor, the reactor could regulate its own 
temperature, meaning that it could not melt down. If the reaction gets too hot, the expanding 
liquid fuel will be forced out of the reaction chamber into the circulating system, decreasing 
the amount of fuel and cooling down the reaction. If too much fuel is pushed out and the 
power begins dropping, the lack of liquid in the chamber causes more space in the core, 
which means less moderation and more reactivity, causing the power to rise again. The cycle 
constantly repeats itself, always regulating itself for the optimal temperature.167 
There are a variety of theories as to why the US did not pursue this technology after 
the nuclear aircraft project was cancelled. These theories boil down to the fact that this 
technology wasn’t an effective method for producing nuclear weapons. In the 1960s, when 
the US was trying to produce as many weapons as possible, Thorium simply wasn’t a viable 
option, and so the technology was pushed aside for the more dangerous and complicated 
pressurized water reactors, which were good at producing the materials for nuclear weapons. 
India, which has the largest supply of Thorium in the world, has embraced the 
research conducted at Oak Ridge and invested heavily in Thorium-powered reactors. The 
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Oak Ridge reactor type, called a Molten Salt Reactor (MSR), after the liquid fuel used in it, 
has played heavily into the future of the Indian nuclear program. They have begun 
developing different variants of the MSR-type reactors, some that rely on Thorium, and some 
that rely on Uranium-238. With current reactor technology, the amount of Thorium in India 
could theoretically power the country for 10,000 years, and if the technology was made more 
efficient, it could last 60,000 years.168  
 If India is successful in their implementation of this new generation of nuclear 
reactor, it could change power and energy throughout the world. A nation crippled by a lack 
of power could begin exporting both power and technology. Nations without access to large 
bodies of water could begin building safe, proliferation-resistant nuclear power plants to 
provide access to their people. An additional benefit of MSRs is that, instead of Thorium, 
nations can also use depleted Uranium or Uranium from disassembled weapons as fuel, 
eliminating the need for nuclear waste repositories like the one at Yucca Mountain in 
Nevada.  
India is an important strategic partner of the US and while their growing power is not 
a direct threat to the US, it is a growing threat to regional and global stability.169 While the 
India-China rivalry is a fairly conventional, historical rivalry, the Indian military was soundly 
defeated in the Sino-Chinese war, which demonstrated the weaknesses in their military 
structure and technology, leaving unresolved conflict between the two. Border friction 
between the two nations exists to this day, and if India improves their infrastructure and 
technology, innovation could mean a new confidence for India, which could drive a renewed 
                                                          









conflict between the two nations. As a close ally, the US would be placed in a destabilizing 
situation as it would be forced to choose to either join in what could realistically become a 
world war or abandon its ally to face the Chinese alone.  
 
US Consequences 
 Because of US inattention to its nuclear arsenal and failure to innovate, the nation is 
facing several major geopolitical dangers that may lead to a fundamental shift in international 
relations. This section will briefly address some geopolitical issues and international actors 
not covered in the previous sections. First is a rapidly rising China that is breeding trouble in 
the Trans-Pacific region for the US and its interests there. While the US is committed to 
maintaining its Pacific influence through partnerships with Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, 
it is beginning to feel more pressure from China. China continues its unimpeded push into the 
East and South China Seas, its continued support of North Korea, and its attempts to 
undermine regional US alliances, demonstrating China’s view of the US as a weakening 
power. Weakening that is, in part, due to outdated technology and overextension in other 
regions of the world.  
Next, US national security is still being endangered by the remnants of the rogue 
innovation age and nations like Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea who have upset the nuclear 
power balance and trained their sights on important US partners (i.e., India, Israel, 
Japan/South Korea). Not beholden to any treaties, these nations are focused on highly mobile 
missile forces that avoid many of the security problems that come with having permanent 
silos. The often-unpredictable nations can rapidly deploy their difficult to track forces and 
attack the US or its allies with little to no warning. Without modern nuclear technologies, this 





 The final geopolitical threat that the US is currently facing, as a result of stagnant US 
nuclear innovation, is conventional threats from Russia and Iran. For the last 15 years, the US 
has had a large presence in the Middle East – deposing dictators, intervening in civil wars, 
and attempting to right past wrongs. However, due to indecision and strategic failures 
throughout the wars, the protracted conflict has no end in sight. Combined with a 
deteriorating nuclear deterrent capability from the US, Russia and Iran have begun 
intervening in the Middle East, directly undermining the influence and position of the US 
there.170 Russia’s public support for Syrian dictator Assad is the most overt example of the 
Russian government and military opposing US strategy and efforts in the region. 
Additionally, the Russians have been working to take military support from the Turks, 
recently reaching an agreement to sell the Turks SA-21 surface-to-air missile (SAM) 
systems.171 Iran, while not a close political partner of Russia, also has an interest in 
preventing US interventions in the Middle East and expanding their territory. They have used 
the constantly changing power of the US in the Middle East to their advantages on multiple 
occasions, wrestling control of territory from the Islamic State (IS) for their own purposes. 
While, at times, they have been a valuable asset in the fight against IS, many are concerned 
that with IS fading, they with capitalize on the future power vacuum that will inevitably arise 
in IS’s wake.172  
 Nations around the world are beginning to recognize the waning influence of the US 
as a result of its inability to provide the nuclear deterrence capability it once was. This is not 
                                                          













to say that the US no longer possesses a deadly nuclear force, just that the US’s competitors 
are beginning to smell the death throes of that force. If US leadership is unwilling to 
recognize the dangers that are facing it, it will be faced with far more dangerous geopolitical 






CHAPTER VII:  
 
 
THE US IN THE SECOND NUCLEAR AGE 
In the last decade, America has seen two Presidential administrations pursuing 
contrasting national and energy security visions. President Barak Obama’s strategy was 
diplomacy-focused while emphasizing “green” power and a disdain for nuclear weapons. 
After eight years of the Obama Administration’s strategy, President Donald Trump was 
elected in November 2016 on promises of bringing back coal power, increasing military 
spending, and a willingness to use nuclear weapons offensively.  
 The 21st century began with the US shift to counterinsurgency as a result of the 9/11 
attack. After the decline of nuclear reactors in the 1980s, nuclear weapons reached a low 
point of relevancy for military planners in the early 2000s. Fighting the “War on Terror" 
meant the military’s focus was shifted from mutually assured destruction through nuclear 
weapons to traditional fighting tactics with conventional forces relying on personnel. As a 
result of this change, nuclear infrastructure, weapons and reactors were largely ignored. 
Under President Obama, nuclear power was publicly denounced, resulting in the closure of 
nuclear power plants in California, Florida, Wisconsin, Vermont, and Nebraska during his 
tenure.173 Additionally, before a crowd in Prague, Czech Republic, the President told the 
world that the US, “as the sole country ever to fire a nuclear weapon in anger, bears the 
moral responsibility for launching a new era of nuclear disarmament aimed at eliminating 
nuclear stockpiles.”174 His Presidency would see "America's commitment to seek the peace 
and security of a world without nuclear weapons." 
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While President Obama was not able to fully achieve this goal during his time in 
office, he made advancements toward it. “As of September 2016, the US active stockpile of 
nuclear warheads consisted of 4,018 warheads. This number represents an 82 percent 
reduction from its level (22,217) when the Berlin Wall fell in late 1989.”175 From fiscal years 
1994 through 2016, the United States dismantled 10,681 nuclear warheads, although a 
disproportionately large percentage occurred between 2009 and 2016. “From fiscal year 2009 
through the end of fiscal year 2016, the US dismantled 2,226 warheads and retired 1,255 
weapons.”176 A decreasing quantity of outdated weapons combined with crumbling, 
dangerous nuclear power plants have put the US’s state of national security in a perilous 
position.  
The Trump administration, under President Trump, has acknowledged the important 
role of nuclear power and the sad state of its condition, but done very little to correct any 
problems thus far. In the administration’s first nuclear posture review, released in Q1 2018, 
President Trump indicated that he will continue many of President Obama’s policies and 
views on nuclear power, however, he did specify that he foresees nuclear weapons playing a 
larger role in the defense of the nations, specifically with a focus on Russian aggression.177 
The nuclear strategy released in the posture review was much tamer than the policies 
proposed by the President during his campaign, which has left many concerned that he is 
apathetic toward the US’s dying nuclear weapons industry.  
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The situation for nuclear reactors in 2018 remains bleak from a political perspective. 
Due to a politically bloated regulation and certification process, coupled with general apathy 
toward new industry as a whole, there is only one nuclear plant under construction in the 
entire country, with an undetermined future. The Vogtle Nuclear Plant in Georgia is currently 
five years behind schedule and $9 billion over budget.178 By the time of completion, the new 
reactor could have a price tag of up to $25 billion, an absurd figure when considering that 
China is building similar reactors for $4 billion.179 President Trump, a pro-coal advocate, and 
his Secretary of Energy, Rick Perry, a pro-oil former Texas governor, have not given the 
nuclear community any confidence in future nuclear plant production.  
The nuclear state of affairs may be dismal, but there is still a path forward if the 
government is focused on national security. Looking to the future, there are several different 
courses of action that the US government should consider. First and foremost, the 
government must begin innovating nuclear technology again. It has the resources and the 
infrastructure in place to guarantee the nation’s security without beginning an arms race. By 
relying on modern, emerging technologies instead of sheer numbers, the US government can 
provide for the common defense, improve international relations at a time when the US is 
decidedly unpopular internationally, and achieve self-sufficiency through safe, green 
methods.  
To begin the process of innovating nuclear reactors, the US must invest and 
encourage participation by private industries, pursue India’s Thorium strategy, and loosen the 
crippling regulations imposed by the NRC. For innovation in nuclear weapons, the 
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government must let the nuclear weapons labs build nuclear weapons instead of continuing 
repair of the same antiquated platforms that are 50 years old. It also must stop investing in 
the money-pit that has become strategic anti-ballistic missiles, or ground-based midcourse 
defense (GMD).180 Nuclear innovation is not a Cold War-era concept; India and China are 
pursuing it with fervor, and so to must the US.  
 
The Path for Reactors 
 The biggest resource of future innovation for nuclear reactors lies in encouraging and 
funding private industry. In September, Idaho Senator Jim Risch stated that, “to maintain our 
competitiveness over countries like China that are pouring ever more resources into advanced 
nuclear technologies, the U.S. must have policies in place and provide the resources to 
support U.S. R&D, and the partnerships between industry and the national labs that will 
enable the rapid development, commercialization and deployment of new reactors, including 
SMRs and advanced non-water cooled reactors.”181 Senator Risch is, in part, referring to the 
growing private nuclear industry in the US that is fueling the path to US participation in the 
second nuclear innovation age. There is a burgeoning sector of US private industry that has 
recognized and begun pursuing smaller, privately owned nuclear reactors.  
 SpaceX’s revival of the space exploration industry demonstrates the effect that 
private industry can have. Nuclear power companies like Flibe, Terrestrial Energy, 
Transatomic Power Corporation, and Bill Gates’ TerraPower are fueling a renewed interest 
and focus on peaceful power generation. They have easily identified the enormous concerns 
                                                          
180 GMD is designed to intercept ICBMs outside the earth’s atmosphere. 







presented by pressurized water reactors and are actively pursuing safer, more efficient 
reactors. Many of the companies have identified superpowers like Westinghouse Electric as 
major roadblocks of nuclear innovation, and like SpaceX, are working to break the 
stranglehold of companies that are largely funded by the US government.182 The US 
government is not an entity known for its ability to deviate from the status quo, but to stay 
relevant in the 21st century, it must begin considering options other than unconditional 
support for the recently bankrupt Westinghouse.183 The focus on MSRs as well as small, 
more decentralized reactors known as small modular reactors (SMRs) are the only feasible 
way forward for the US. China and India will surpass the US in their capabilities due to their 
head start in nuclear innovation, but it is up to the US to decide whether it wants to stay 
relevant.  
 The second step that the US must take in innovating nuclear reactors is to focus on 
the use of Thorium. As of 2015, the US has the 9th largest reserves of Uranium, with 138,000 
tons, mining about 1,125 tons per year, and only using about 9% of its own locally mined 
uranium in its reactors, importing much of it from Kazakhstan, Canada, and Australia184 
However, the US has the 3rd highest Thorium reserves in the world, about 400,000 tons, or 
13% of the entire world reserves. With such abundant reserves of Thorium at the nation’s 
disposal, the US could power itself for thousands of years. The private industry has seen the 
limitless possibilities that result from the use of Thorium, but the government must be willing 
to pursue them as well.  
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 The final piece of the nuclear reactor innovation plan must come from the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC). The NRC is the government agency tasked with overseeing 
the safety of nuclear reactors as well as the licensing of new and existing reactors. The intent 
behind having an organization like the NRC is necessary for safeguarding the public, but 
they have become a poorly run entity. Their primary role in the nuclear community has been 
promoting big businesses such as Westinghouse. When a company like Westinghouse comes 
forward with a proposal for a new reactor, the NRC will “rubber stamp” the proposal, 
automatically approving the plans. However, when a non-industry company, such as one of 
the various newer startup reactors companies, submits a proposal, the NRC has blocked it a 
majority of the time, blocking 32 out of 36 plans submitted at the beginning of the decade.185 
Any plans that are not blocked outright will be drown in red tape and bureaucratic delays. 
The current, short-term obstacle for any innovation in nuclear reactors comes from blatant 
corruption and over-politicization of the NRC. Additionally, the NRC has become 
historically famous for intentionally overlooking security flaws in big-business reactor 
designs in order to continue construction. Until the government focuses on revamping or 
simply eradicating the political and safety nightmare that is the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, innovation and power production cannot proceed.  
 Roadblocks aside, reactor innovation will prove to be much easier for the US than 
nuclear weapon innovation. The innovation of nuclear weapons is not a difficult process in 
itself but innovating without starting an arms race or all-out war is a much more difficult 
task. Just as the Chinese have created their hypersonic glide vehicle, the US must focus on 
developing newer, more modern technologies – technology that doesn’t rely on floppy disks 
                                                          






and 1970s computers. It must accept that bigger is not better. Low-yield, highly accurate 
nuclear weapons are far less destabilizing than megaton-size city killers. The US must still 
continue to maintain its deterrence capabilities, but nuclear innovation of smaller and more 
accurate nuclear weapons can lead both the US and the other nuclear powers to a more stable 
geopolitical state.  
 Anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems are another nuclear weapons technology that 
acts as a global destabilizing factor. In 1972, the US and USSR signed a treaty that tightly 
controlled the use of anti-ballistic missile systems designed to shoot down incoming ICBMs. 
The treaty was proposed by the US, the global leader at the time in ABM systems, out of fear 
that the rapidly advancing ABM system would spark another arms race. In 2001, President 
Bush announced that the US would withdraw from the ABM treaty in order to protect itself 
from nuclear blackmail by rogue states such as North Korea and Libya. The US then began 
investing billions of dollars towards solving the problem of shooting down a rocket flying in 
space while moving 15,000mph, or as engineer Montgomery Scott once quipped, “trying to 
hit a bullet with a smaller bullet, whilst wearing a blindfold, riding a horse.”186  
Aside from the technical complexity, and the enormous cost – $40 billion to develop 
the midcourse defense system, and approximately $200 million per test – ABMs are an 
inherently provocative and destabilizing system.187 The Russians and the Chinese have both 
publicly voiced outrage at the advancement and placement of US ABM systems. In 2008, 
“the Russian military, furious at American plans to install a missile defense shield in Eastern 
Europe, talked of the prospect of turning Cuba into a base for its long-range nuclear 
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bombers.”188 As discussed previously, the THAADs being installed in South Korea has also 
been a major point of contention throughout the Trans-Pacific region. The more effective that 
US ABM systems become, the more unsafe the geopolitical climate will become. Due to the 
largely unsuccessful history of ABM tests and the staggering costs, the US should instead 
direct the ABM funds toward nuclear reactor and weapons development. 
 
  
                                                          










Nuclear power is the foundation of modern, 21st century nations. Without nuclear 
weapons and a willingness to improve its atomic technological capabilities, a nation is 
irrelevant. After the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the first nuclear 
innovation age produced unprecedented economic growth and enhanced national security. 
The US and the USSR poured money into technological renewal at a staggering rate, 
investing in fusion bombs, submarine-based reactors, ICBMs, ABM systems and MIRVs. In 
pursuit of national security in a new geopolitical world, the two created a balance of terror 
that reduced the prospect of war between major powers.  
The first nuclear innovation age came to a jolting end when the Chernobyl reactor 
exploded, and the USSR collapsed, further complicating global geopolitics. Without a rival 
superpower to defend against, the US government began shifting their national security focus 
to other areas, preferring to distance itself from the politically charged topic of nuclear 
power. While it had pioneered nuclear innovation, the US began falling dangerously far 
behind its competitors. Once nuclear power’s biggest champion, the US has turned its back 
on nuclear innovation in favor of unreliable ABM systems, delusional expectations of global 
cooperation between major powers and environmentally destructive fossil fuels. The 
government’s disdain for nuclear power has permeated the public perception, leading to 
vilification of nuclear power and a unwillingness to improve a energy source vital for 
national and economic security.  
Global, 21st century national security has transitioned away from large conventional 





military modernization and weaponization of their nuclear programs, India and China have 
taken the lead on atomic innovation, beginning a second nuclear innovation age. India and 
China see nuclear innovation as a major factor in guaranteeing national security again. Both 
nations realize their nuclear technologies were antiquated and too reliant upon external 
powers. China has begun developing new nuclear weapons and large-scale nuclear reactors 
hoping to enhance their national security position vis-à-vis major competitors. India, due to a 
lack of uranium, has invested heavily in emerging technologies that would provide safer, 
more efficient power for the nation’s rapidly expanding population. 
Although China could surpass US nuclear capabilities, time has not yet run out for 
saving US national security. If the US is willing to break some of the norms that it has 
established over the last 60 years and begin innovating again, it could correct its course. 
Investing in private nuclear industries, Thorium research, and new nuclear weapons, while 
limiting the NRC and ABM investments would substantially bolster US national security to a 
point where it is no longer in peril. The nation needs innovative minds like Ernest Rutherford 
and Robert Oppenheimer to lead the country out of their nuclear apathy and back to a place 
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